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Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against 
Minorities 
Todd Donovan†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Direct popular voting on legislation, although rare in most 
established democracies, is the norm in several American 
states that make frequent use of the citizen initiative process.1 
In all states, legislators may also refer constitutional amend-
ments to voters for popular approval.2 Topics of popular initia-
tives and constitutional amendments span a wide range, but 
popular votes on matters of individual rights are one of the 
more unique and controversial aspects of American direct de-
mocracy.3
 
†  Professor of Political Science, Western Washington University, Bel-
lingham, Washington. Sincere thanks for the opportunity to present an earlier 
version of this article at the Minnesota Law Review’s “A More Perfect Union? 
Democracy in the Age of Ballot Initiatives” symposium in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota (Oct. 26, 2012). Thanks to Tom Pryor, Andrew Hart, Anne Dwyer, Brian 
Burke and members of the Law Review for their work on the symposium and 
for their diligent efforts with various drafts of this manuscript. Any remaining 
errors are my responsibility. Copyright © 2013 by Todd Donovan. 
 Americans are frequently asked to make decisions 
about rights afforded to various minority groups, and to cast 
 1. Cf. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 
1503, 1510 n.23 (1989) (noting that twenty-four states have the power to force 
the legislature to refer legislature enactments to the electorate). 
 2. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republi-
can Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19 
(1993) (noting that voters rejected a proposed constitutional amendment). 
 3. E.g., id. at 19–45; cf. Eule, supra note 1, at 1503–90 (considering how 
courts should go about deciding challenges to the constitutionality of voter’s 
enactment as democracy becomes more direct). See generally Derrick A. Bell, 
The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(1978) (explaining that the threat of direct democracy fueled with elected rep-
resentatives underperforming causes voters to pursue a “do-it-yourself” meth-
od). 
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votes on policies that are associated with a clearly identifiable 
minority.4
In this Article, I discuss why campaigns and voting on bal-
lot measures associated with rights questions are unique when 
compared to campaigns and voting for candidates and other 
ballot measures. In Part I, I discuss how direct-democracy 
campaigns generally differ from candidate campaigns, and I 
propose that voter consideration of issues, and voter assess-
ments of groups associated with an issue placed on the ballot, 
play a more prominent role in direct democracy than in candi-
date contests. One implication of this is that direct-democracy 
campaigns focus critical attention on minority groups associat-
ed with a policy issue. This means that voting based on stereo-
types and negative affect toward a group may be far more pro-
nounced in direct democracy than in other electoral contexts. In 
Part II, I argue that the unique context of direct-democracy 
campaigns against minorities also involves a politics of back-
lash, where legislative and judicial outcomes favoring minori-
ties are targeted for repeal via referendum and initiative. Mi-
nority gains achieved in the legislative and judicial arenas can 




This sets the stage for a discussion of same-sex ballot 
measures in Part III. There, I provide a brief overview of ballot 
measures on the subject of lesbian and gay rights, and a de-
scription of how lesbian and gay rights and the courts are por-
trayed in direct-democracy campaigns. My overview of cam-
paign ads illustrates that contemporary campaigns against the 
right to marry lack the explicit, overt animus of older direct-
democracy campaigns against gay rights, but contemporary 
campaigns continue to make use of enduring stereotypes about 
the threat of homosexuality. Part IV of this Article explores 
what I call the spillover effects of direct-democracy campaigns 
against minorities. Specifically, campaigns against same-sex 
marriage in 2004 had the capacity to move popular opinion to-
ward being less sympathetic to gays and lesbians as a group. I 
conclude with Part V, in which I discuss how we might general-
ize from campaigns against same-sex marriage to a broader 
understanding of the role of direct-democracy campaigns that 
 
 
 4. E.g., Linde, supra note 2, at 19 (rejecting a constitutional proposal 
aimed against homosexuality). 
 5. Cf. Bell, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining how courts use existing consti-
tutional principles to protect minority rights against majoritarian abuses). 
  
1732 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1730 
 
attempt to define minority rights. I suggest that—even if courts 
were to resolve the same-sex marriage debate—without new 
restraints, the process of direct democracy will continue to facil-
itate a backlash against minority groups that are perceived as 
a threat to an electoral majority, and facilitate a backlash 
against democratic institutions that protect minority rights.  
I.  CAMPAIGNS FOR CANDIDATES COMPARED TO 
CAMPAIGNS ABOUT ISSUES   
Campaigns and voter decision making on initiatives and 
referendums differ substantially from candidate contests in 
several important ways. Voter decisions in candidate contests 
are aided by a wide range of durable, directly accessible deci-
sion heuristics that precede any campaign (such as partisan-
ship6 and incumbency7). Voter decisions in candidate races are 
influenced by such factors, as well as by interest group en-
dorsements,8 voter evaluations of candidate traits (such as 
competence, integrity, and reliability),9 and potentially by voter 
response to a candidate’s position on a range of issues. Alt-
hough single-issue voting in candidate contests may be relevant 
to some voters’ decisions, voters demonstrate high levels of un-
certainty about a candidate’s issue positions, even in presiden-
tial elections.10
 
 6. See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER UNABRIDGED 
EDITION 274 (1960) (noting that one’s individual expression of partnership is 
associated with the individual’s statement of voting behavior); see also 
MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 149–50 
(2008) (stating that voting for the same party in successive elections causes 
more fervent partisan commitment).  
  
 7. See generally Gary N. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incum-
bency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 478–
97 (1996) (arguing that the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be 
decomposed into direct and indirect effects). 
 8. See generally Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 951, 951–71 (2001) (asserting that endorsements have obvious heu-
ristic values). 
 9. Cf. Arthur H. Miller et al., Schematic Assessments of Presidential 
Candidates, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 521, 521–24 (1986) (stating that personality 
characteristics of the candidates provides an understanding of voter behavior). 
 10. See Herbert F. Weisberg & Morris Fiorina, Candidate Preference Un-
der Uncertainty: An Expanded View of Rational Voting, in JOHN C. PIERCE & 
JOHN L. SULLIVAN, THE ELECTORATE RECONSIDERED 238 (1980) (stating that 
uncertainty exists in a number of ways, such as a voter misperceiving a candi-
date’s policy position on an issue). See generally Larry M. Bartels, Issue Voting 
Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Test, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 709, 709–28 (1986) 
(contributing a survey response to estimate the respondent’s uncertainty 
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Any single issue associated with a campaign to elect a can-
didate is thus just one of many factors that influence choices 
over candidates, and any single issue will thus play a limited 
role in how candidate campaigns appeal to and affect voters.11 
Although a simplification of reality, it is sound to assume that 
most voters approach candidate contests with pre-existing par-
tisan leanings,12 and that many others decide based on retro-
spective evaluations of incumbent performance.13 There is lim-
ited scope, then, for candidate contests to be based 
predominately on judgments about a single issue, let alone a 
single issue associated with rights afforded to a minority 
group.14
Direct democracy presents a markedly different context for 
decision making. As with candidate races, cues and heuristics 




about where a candidate stands on the issues).  
 but initiative and 
 11. Cf., e.g., John H. Aldrich et al., Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do 
Candidates “Waltz Before A Blind Audience?”, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 123, 123–
41 (1989) (resolving the anomaly that voters possess little information about 
foreign or defense polices, which in turn have negligible impact on their voting 
behavior). 
 12. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 274 (noting that one’s individu-
al expression of partnership is associated with the individual’s statement of 
voting behavior); see also Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 
1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35, 35–50 (2000) (asserting the impact of parti-
sanship in voting behavior has increased). 
 13. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Economic Retrospective Voting in 
American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 426, 426–
43 (1978) (assessing whether citizens vote against or for the incumbent presi-
dent’s party); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Douglas Rivers, A Retrospective on Retro-
spective Voting, 6 POL. BEHAV. 369, 369–93 (1984) (analyzing retrospective 
voting in response to actual outcomes that are incumbency-oriented). 
 14. Candidate campaigns do use issues that appear designed to weaken 
an opponent by appealing to anxiety and/or prejudice associated with an iden-
tifiable minority. See generally TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAM-
PAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY (2001). 
Examples include affirmative action (e.g., Jesse Helms’ 1990 US Senate race), 
immigration (e.g., Pete Wilson’s 1994 gubernatorial campaign), and fear of 
black-on-white crime (e.g., George H.W. Bush’s 1988 presidential race). As 
much as these may be visible in candidate races, they are unlikely to be the 
dominant cue affecting voter choice, and thus unlikely to be a dominant cam-
paign theme. Cf. Aldrich et al., supra note 11, at 123 (asserting that voters 
have little information about prominent issues, which in turn have negligible 
impact on their voting behavior).  
 15. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and 
Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 63, 63 (1994) (noting that voters acquire information about policies 
through “friends, coworkers, political parties, or other groups, which they may 
then use to infer how a proposition will affect them”); see also SHAUN BOWLER 
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referendum voting is less directly linked to partisanship and 
incumbency. Although incumbent elected officials may write 
ballot questions (this is the only route to the ballot for legisla-
tive-referred constitutional amendments16), incumbents’ posi-
tions and party endorsements are not listed on the ballot with 
referendum and initiative questions.17 Voting directly on a poli-
cy question is, by definition, a form of issue voting. Voters 
clearly do rely on their partisanship,18 and utilize multiple 
sources of information when deciding on ballot questions,19 but 
narrower forces associated with the single issue at hand are 
likely to be much more dominant in referendum voting than in 
candidate voting. At the very least, when we compare the broad 
range of factors that affect voters in candidate races, decisions 
on ballot questions occur in a context where a single issue car-
ries (relatively) far more influence.20 By extension, initiatives 
and referendums that ask voters to make choices about minori-
ty rights also ask voters to evaluate members of the minority 
group that is the subject of the rights question.21
 
& TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING AND DIRECT DE-
MOCRACY 33 (1998) (stating that “with the use of heuristics in political reason-
ing, different cues might be relevant for different voters”).  
 Referendums 
 16. See Legislatively-Referred Constitutional Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Legislatively-referred_constitutional_ 
amendmenthttp://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Legislatively-referred_ 
constitutional_amendment (last updated Nov. 3, 2011) (noting under legisla-
tively-referred amendment, the amendment initiated by state’s legislature, 
like an incumbent elected official, can only be approved or rejected by the vot-
ers). 
 17. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors: The Real 
Threat to Campaign Disclosure Statutes 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Law and Poli-
tics, Working Paper No. 13, 2004) (“[D]irect democracy lacks one of the most 
powerful cues in candidate elections: party affiliation, a cue that appears on 
most general election ballots next to candidate names.”). 
 18. See Regina P. Branton, Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior 
on State Ballot Propositions, 56 POL. RES. Q. 367, 368 (2003) (noting that gen-
eral relationship between partisanship and voting behavior). 
 19. See generally Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Do Voters Have a Cue? 
Television Advertisements as a Source of Information in Citizen-Initiated Ref-
erendum Campaigns, 41 EUR. J. POL. RES. 777, 777–93 (2002) (using the in-
formation sources they use in order to gauge the relative importance of various 
sources that voters rely upon in making voting decisions). 
 20. E.g., Single Issue Voting, RIGHT TO LIFE MICH., http://www.rtl.org/ 
endorsements/singleissue_voting.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that 
the United States has a history of “voters who go to the polls to vote for a can-
didate or against another candidate based on a single issue”). 
 21. This point of linking decisions about an issue to the group that voters 
associate with the issue is developed in detail in Part II below. 
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on minority rights have the capacity to be largely about approv-
ing or disapproving members of a minority group.22
As noted above, voters faced with decisions on referendums 
and initiatives have access to useful cues that may simplify 
their decision making, but they are also exposed to information 
about the issue they are deciding on, and information about 
groups that may be affected by the proposal.
 
23 Indeed, aware-
ness of which group is affected by a policy may itself be a heu-
ristic that voters use when deciding on a proposal.24 Cues in 
this context come in two overlapping forms: one associated with 
liking or disliking a group, and another associated with “what 
is after all the most vital political information: Who and what 
one is for or against.”25 The latter may be used by voters as a 
shortcut to figure out how to agree with opinion leaders or 
groups they trust, and thus how to vote with their underlying 
preference on the matter in mind.26 On the other hand, atti-
tudes about the group affected by a policy allow voters a means 
to reason about the policy. Knowing that a group that the voter 
likes will benefit from a policy outcome may lead the voter to 
support action that produces that outcome.27 Conversely, a vot-
er may oppose something if she believes that a group she does 
not like stands to benefit.28
Information about policy questions on the ballot (and, fre-
quently, the group affected by the question) is available from 





 22. See Linde, supra note 
 In many states, voters also receive a government-
2, at 41 (providing examples of initiatives that 
approve or disapprove minority groups). 
 23. Bowler & Donovan, supra note 19, at 782–83 (stating that voters use 
television as a source of information when voting). 
 24. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS 
IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 114 (1991) (noting that some voters rely on a likea-
bility heuristic in figuring out the issue position of strategic groups in politics). 
 25. See id. at 115. 
 26. Cf. Lupia, supra note 15, at 66 (noting that voters can make more ac-
curate decisions about voting with information from credible sources); see also 
Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsement in Initiative Campaigns, 
in SHAUN BOWLER, TODD DONOVAN & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, CITIZENS AS 
LEGISLATORS 150 (1998) (asserting that public opinion forms from activities, 
organized groups, and elected officials). 
 27. E.g., SNIDERMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 46 (stating that a person is 
likely to be supportive about AIDS if he is supportive of gay rights). 
 28. E.g., id. at 45–47 (stating that homophobia plays a role in shaping 
public attitudes concerning the rights of people with AIDS). 
 29. See, e.g., 2012 Information for Voters, WILLIAM FRANCIS GALVIN: SEC-
RETARY COMMONWEALTH MASS., http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele12/ballot_ 
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funded voter’s handbook that describes the issue, with argu-
ments for and against,30 which voters often rely upon.31 As 
much as campaigns may have incentives to obfuscate and dis-
tort, it is difficult to mount a campaign supporting or opposing 
a referendum without addressing the substance of the issue on 
the ballot or without addressing the groups that benefit from or 
are harmed by the proposal. Although many ballot-measure 
campaigns are low-budget affairs,32 initiative campaigns have 
spent more on TV ads than presidential campaigns in some 
states.33 Even when ballot measures have lower levels of spend-
ing, the presence of a referendum on a state ballot can draw 
more media attention to the issue than would have otherwise 
been the case.34
There are likely several ways that voters might reason 
about a ballot issue, and thus several potential methods that 
campaigns might use to appeal to voters. Rational voters may 
require information about how a proposal advances themselves, 
their group, or their partisan interest.
 
35 Voters concerned with 
wider social effects of a policy36
 
questions_12/message12.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that each 
ballot question will have additional information to help voters). 
 may require information about 
broader consequences of adopting the policy. Each of these 
models of reasoning presumes that voters are at least modestly 
 30. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPO-
SITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 56–58 (1984) (discussing use of voter hand-
books). 
 31. E.g., Bowler & Donovan, supra note 19, at 781 (finding that 73% of 
voter guides are provided by the state); see BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 
15, at 58 (exploring what elements of the handbook the voters find useful). 
 32. E.g., Todd Donovan et al., Contending Players and Strategies: Opposi-
tion Advantages in Initiative Campaigns, in BOWLER, DONOVAN & TOLBERT, 
supra note 26, at 93–94 (noting that one of California’s most celebrated initia-
tives was an “anti-illegal immigrant Proposition,” in which proponents only 
spent $800,000). 
 33. Cf. TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE & LOCAL POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS & 
REFORM 102 (2011) (“High levels of spending on initiative TV ads probably in-
crease public awareness of initiatives and may increase public attention to 
campaign issues.” (footnote omitted)). 
 34. See, e.g., Todd Donovan et al., Priming Presidential Votes by Direct 
Democracy, 70 J. POL. 1217, 1220 (2008) (comparing media attention sur-
rounding gay marriage, on whether gay marriage was an initiative on a state’s 
ballot). 
 35. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRA-
CY (1957) (discussing utility maximization of rational voters). 
 36. See, e.g., Donald R. Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Sociotropic Politics: 
The American Case, 11 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 129, 131 (1981) (noting that working-
class citizens normally support social welfare policies). 
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sophisticated, have some minimal level of conceptual and cogni-
tive capacities, and are sufficiently motivated. In a world domi-
nated by self-interested voters, campaigns would have incen-
tives to provide voters with information about “what’s in it for 
them.”37 In a world dominated by voters with broader social 
concerns, campaigns would have incentives to provide infor-
mation about broad outcomes associated with policy adoption.38
Alternatively, a ballot issue may tap into values, beliefs, 
and stereotypes that are “so ingrained over a long period that 
[they] structure[] voters’ ‘gut responses’” and require no concep-
tual sophistication.
 
39 Decision making on issues that affect a 
clearly identifiable group, moreover, may be structured by posi-
tive or negative affect for the group.40 Different types of ballot 
issues may elicit different types of reasoning, and any particu-
lar issue may find different voters reasoning in terms of self-
interest, or social concerns, or gut values. Self-interest may be 
at the forefront for more voters when reasoning about tax 
measures,41 for example, but many voters likely also decide on 
tax matters in terms of broader social, normative, and ideologi-
cal concerns.42 Societal concerns, conversely, may be relatively 
more dominant on votes over governance, smoking regulations, 
drugs policy, or assisted suicide;43 but values, self-interest, ide-
ology, and other forces would also be relevant to voter decisions 
on such matters.44
 
 37. Id. at 131 (noting that middle class voters oppose social welfare poli-
cies because they gain no benefit). 
  
 38. E.g., id. at 132 (explaining that citizens concerned about economic ef-
fects of voting would want to have that information). 
 39. Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue 
Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78, 78 (1980). 
 40. E.g., SNIDERMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 46 (stating that supporting 
rights of a person with AIDS stems from some people’s supportive nature to 
the gay community).  
 41. See generally BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 85–106 (examin-
ing the motivations of voters in elections that are focused primarily on tax and 
spending initiatives). 
 42. See id. at 105 (arguing that self-interested motivations do not neces-
sarily supersede one’s “symbolic or ideological determinants of the vote”). 
 43. E.g., id. (suggesting that the policy content of the ballot issues is rele-
vant to determine how voters may vote, which may not be based in self-
interest). 
 44. See id. (asserting that based on the policy content, one may vote based 
on “symbolic themes” or ideology). 
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II.  POLITICS OF BACKLASH: THE UNIQUE CONTEXT OF 
POPULAR VOTES ON MINORITY RIGHTS   
Ballot questions about matters of minority rights present a 
unique decision context for voters. Clearly, voters will evaluate 
rights questions in terms of partisan cues,45 political ideology,46 
broad social concerns, and normative concerns about procedur-
al fairness.47 Some, particularly those in the affected minority,48 
could approach the issue in terms of personal self-interest. Yet 
direct economic self-interest may be less relevant to a majority 
of voters on questions of minority rights than on questions 
about taxation and government spending.49 With ballot ques-
tions on matters whose direct effects of the policy fall on a 
clearly identifiable and often unpopular minority—such as vot-
ing on the rights of foreigners to own property, school desegre-
gation, employment of immigrants, language policy, access to 
fair housing, access to public services for illegal immigrants, 
protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
and related topics—the material costs and benefits that affect 
many individuals in the majority may be trivial, or ethereal.50
The distribution of costs and benefits of such policies is dif-




 45. See Branton, supra note 
 As a 
result, economic self-interest may play less of a role in voting 
18, at 372 (stating that studies indicate that 
a voter’s partisan affiliation is consistent with individual voting behaviors on 
ballot issues). 
 46. See id. (finding that “ideology is associated with voting behavior in 
approximately 44 percent of the models”). 
 47. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcomes and Procedures, 
35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000) (finding that a review of research demon-
strates that people are more willing to accept decisions when they feel that 
those decisions are made through decision-making procedures they view as 
fair). 
 48. Analysis of survey data demonstrates that whites, Latinos, Asians, 
and African Americans have similar preferences over most ballot measures, 
but minorities vote differently than whites (and are more likely to oppose) bal-
lot measures that affect minorities adversely. See generally Zoltan L. Hajnal et 
al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Proposition 
Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 154–77 (2002). 
 49. Cf. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 89 (arguing that it might 
be easier for a voter to perceive self-interest produced by policies that are tan-
gible, like those concerning fiscal issues). 
 50. See id. at 167 (stating that voters on policy issues concerning minori-
ties are “uncaring” and “unthinking”). 
 51. Cf. Todd Donovan et al., Contending Players and Strategies: Opposi-
tion Advantages in Initiative Campaign, in BOWLER, DONOVAN & TOLBERT, 
supra note 26, at 81 (examining the success of passing policies that are broad 
or narrow in effect). 
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on rights. With questions of minority rights, regardless of the 
outcome of the vote, a majority of voters stand to gain (or lose) 
very little in the way of material benefits. Conversely, tangible 
costs are targeted to a relatively small minority. As an exam-
ple, a policy proposal to prevent a few non-citizens from owning 
land may extend minor economic opportunities to some voters 
in the majority by marginally decreasing demand for (and thus 
cost of) property, but the only immediate economic effect is to 
exclude members of a small minority from ownership. Likewise, 
barring illegal immigrants from receiving public services can 
have very marginal economic effects for a majority by reducing 
the total costs of providing public services paid by voters (tax-
payers) in the majority,52
There are examples of referendum voting where self-
interested economic voting is grounded in objective factors that 
affect many voters. Public employees were found to be more 
likely to oppose a property-tax-cutting measure that would 
have reduced public-sector funding, whereas people paying 
higher property taxes were more likely to support it.
 but the consequences for the smaller 
(non-voting, non-citizen) immigrant minority are more materi-
al, and immediate. In sum, the economic benefits of policies 
constraining minority rights are so widely diffused across the 
majority that they may be trivial to individual majority voters, 
and largely invisible.  
53 Likewise, 
people with children in private schools were more supportive of 
a school-voucher proposal.54 These results are consistent with 
the idea that on fiscal matters voters connect their personal, 
objective economic situation to support for ballot measures that 
advance their personal economic interest.55
 
 52. This would assume that other public sector expenditures would not 
increase as a result of excluding illegal immigrants from access to public ser-
vices such as education. 
 Although subjective 
perceptions of economic self-interest may be in play as a mode 
of reasoning for some voters when considering questions on mi-
nority rights, it is difficult to conceive of a large group of voters 
who would foresee tangible economic benefits from something 
like defining marriage as a union only between a man and a 
woman. Campaigns on such matters will thus need to find oth-
 53. See, e.g., BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 103 n.13 (using Prop-
osition 13 to exemplify that support for the initiative with response to property 
tax burden). 
 54. See id. at 94. 
 55. E.g., id. at 129 (examining voters’ motivations based on a proposition’s 
immediate effect on the person’s income). 
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er ways to convince voters they should be concerned about a 
minority’s rights. 
Further, the campaign and decision-making context sur-
rounding initiatives and referendums on minority rights have 
involved instances where legislative or judicial outcomes that 
favored a minority have altered a previous majority-supported 
status quo.56 Racial and ethnic minorities have made gains (in 
terms of rights protections and policies that advantage racial 
and ethnic minorities) through courts and representative insti-
tutions, particularly since the Voting Rights Act succeeded in 
increasing minority representation in state legislatures.57 Yet 
as legislative bodies have become more representative of racial 
and ethnic minorities, “the electoral majority is reasserting its 
power by undercutting and constraining the power of repre-
sentative government.”58 Bruce Cain named this backlash phe-
nomena “The New Populism,”59 an expression of the concerns of 
“white middle and working classes”60
 
 56. See Bell, supra note 
 voters that constrains—by 
referendum, recall, and citizen-initiated constitutional amend-
ment—the scope of what legislatures (and courts) may do. I 
would add to this list the use of judicial retention elections to 
threaten or remove state supreme-court justices who make rul-
ings that are unpopular, as was the case in Iowa after that 
state’s court unanimously upheld a lower-court ruling that al-
3, at 2 (asserting that courts use existing consti-
tutional principles to protect minority rights against majoritarian abuses). 
 57. See id. at 27 (noting that the Court prevented a dilution of black vot-
ing through the 1965 Voting Rights Act). Sexual-orientation minorities have 
likewise achieved rights gains via courts, and via state and local representa-
tive institutions, but this has occurred independent of the Voting Rights Act. 
See Voting Rights Act (1965), MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. & GLOBAL FREEDOM 
STRUGGLE, http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/ 
encyclopedia/enc_voting_rights_act_1965/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting 
that the Voting Rights Act only afforded African Americans rights).  
 58. Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-
Blind Society?, in BERNARD GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVER-
SIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 261, 273 
(1992). 
 59. Id. at 273–74. Cain was concerned with the weakening of representa-
tive institutions generally, and the broad consequences of this for weaker mi-
nority influence over any policy. Although not noted by Cain, the populist 
backlash is particularly acute with rights questions, and the institutions of 
direct democracy may also weaken the court’s ability to protect minority inter-
ests. See id. at 275; see also Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State 
Courts, Voter Initiative, and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 733, 733–40 (1994) (arguing that judicial protection is imperative when 
voters are motivated by popular passion or prejudice). 
 60. Cain, supra note 58, at 274. 
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lowed same-sex marriage in that state.61 In 2010, Iowa voters 
voted out all three of the state supreme court justices who were 
up for retention.62
A number of anti-minority referendums and initiatives 
provide examples of popular backlash against minority gains 
achieved via legislatures and courts. Legislators extended pro-
tections against race-based housing discrimination, and by do-
ing so, precipitated a popular initiative that repealed the gains 
that minorities had achieved in the legislature.
 
63 Elected repre-
sentatives authorized affirmative-action programs to aid minor-
ities in education and job opportunities, thus triggering initia-
tives that repealed those policies.64 Local councils extended 
anti-discrimination protections to account for discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, leading to local referendums65
 
 61. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that 
the offered governmental objective is not substantial, and that equal protec-
tion clause would require more).  
 and 
 62. See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges over Marriage Is-
sues, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03judges 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O. 
 63. See generally Raymond E. Wolfinger & Fred I. Greenstein, The Repeal 
of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 753 (1968) (discussing voter motivations in overturning California’s 
Rumford Act, which prohibited racial discrimination by realtors and apart-
ment owners. The Act passed in 1963 and was repealed by a ratio of two-to-
one in a 1964 referendum). 
 64. California’s Proposition 209 (1996) was a citizen-initiated constitu-
tional amendment designed to repeal existing affirmative action policies. 
Proposition 209, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Nov. 1996), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
ballot/1996/prop209_11_1996.html. It passed with 54% support. Votes For and 
Against November 5, 1996, Statewide Ballot Measures and Constitutional 
Amendments, CALI. SECRETARY ST. (Nov. 5, 1996), http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
elections/sov/1996-general/votes-for-against.pdf. After local governments and 
state universities adopted affirmative action, Arizona’s legislature referred a 
constitutional amendment (Proposition 107 in 2010) to voters to ban such pro-
grams. Proposition 107, ARIZ. DEP’T ST., OFF. SECRETARY ST. (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/pubpamphlet/english/Prop107.htm. 
Voters approved it with 59% support. State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIZ. 
DEP’T ST., OFF. SECRETARY ST., 14 (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.azsos.gov/ 
election/2010/General/Canvass2010GE.pdf. Initiative 200 in Washington 
(1998), Proposition 2 in Michigan (2006), and Initiative 424 in Nebraska 
(2006) are similar examples. Complete Text of Initiative 200, WASH. SECRE-
TARY ST., http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/1998/i200_text.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013); Notice of State Proposals, MICHIGAN.GOV, 5 (Nov. 2006), http:// 
www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/ED-138_State_Prop_11-06_174276_7.pdf; 
NEBRASKA SECRETARY OF STATE, INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET: INITIATIVE 
MEASURE #424 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/2008/pdf/ 
pamphlet%20424.pdf.  
 65. In 1978, voters in Eugene, Oregon, repealed a local anti-
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state-wide initiatives and referendums designed to repeal such 
policies.66 Same-sex marriage legalized by state legislators was 
repealed by referendum.67 Court-mandated school integration 
produced voter-initiated laws preventing “forced busing” in 
three states.68 Judicial rulings on same-sex marriage have 
likewise precipitated legislative-referred constitutional 
amendments69 and constitutional initiatives70
 
discrimination ordinance. In 1980, voters in Davis, San Jose, and Santa Clara 
County, California, repealed anti-discrimination ordinances passed by councils 
in those communities. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular 
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 258 (1997). 
 designed to re-
turn policy to a previous majority-supported status quo.  
 66. After several communities passed anti-discrimination ordinances, Col-
orado voters approved Amendment 2 (1992) with 53% support. The initiative 
constitutional amendment prohibited the state and its local governments from 
adopting policy that provided that “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
tion” entitled a person to claim protected status or discrimination. Ballot His-
tory, COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL (1992), http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory 
.nsf. Oregon Measure 8 (1988) passed with 53% in support, revoked a ban on 
sexual orientation discrimination that had applied to the state’s executive 
branch. Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995, OR. BLUE BOOK, http:// 
bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013); 
STATE OF OREGON, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 52 (1988), available at http://library 
.state.or.us/repository/2010/201003011350161/ORVPGenMari1988.pdf. 
 67. Question 1 in Maine (2009) was a popular referendum that repealed a 
Maine bill that legalized same-sex marriage. Maine Citizen’s Guide to the Ref-
erendum Election, MAINE.GOV (2009), http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/ 
intent09.htm. 
 68. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIA-
TIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 93 (1989) (noting such initiatives in Colora-
do, Washington, and California). 
 69. Question 2 in Hawaii (1998), for example, was a legislative referred 
constitutional initiative drafted in response to the Hawaii court’s Baehr 1993 
remand that asked a lower court to prove the state had any compelling inter-
est in banning gay marriage. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
The ballot language read: “The proposed amendment is intended to make it 
absolutely clear that the State Constitution gives the Legislature the power 
and authority to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Hawaii Initiatives 
and Referenda: Constitutional Amendment 2, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot-measures-database 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (select States: “Hawaii,” Year: “1998,” Election: 
“General Election,” Measure Type: “Legislative Referendum;” then click 
“Submit Query”). 
 70. Proposition 8 in California (2008), a popular initiative, can be seen as 
a response to the state supreme court ruling in In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 
4th 757 (Cal. 2008), which held an anti-same-sex marriage statute unconstitu-
tional. See Prop 8: Arguments and Rebuttals, CALI. GEN. ELECTION (2008), 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm 
(“Because four activist judges in San Francisco wrongly overturned the peo-
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The populist backlash associated with many of these rights 
contests mean that direct-democracy campaigns over questions 
of minority rights are not simply about a particular right and a 
particular minority group, but may also reflect a reaction to 
counter-majoritarian aspects of democracy that are facilitated 
by courts and representative government. This means that 
rights questions that reach the ballot are frequently also ques-
tions about redefining state constitutions to constrain demo-
cratic procedures that produced gains for minorities in the form 
of legislative policies or rights protections. 
Given this unique context for voter reasoning, compared to 
other measures that reach the ballot,71
One enduring critique of direct democracy is that the pro-
cess allows a majority of voters’ fears and prejudices to be ex-
pressed in policies that target minorities and restrict minority 
rights.
 direct-democracy cam-
paigns offer more room for voting on rights questions to be 
based on animus, negative group affect, negative stereotypes 
about the targeted group, and animus toward general counter-
majoritarian elements of democracy. Campaigns seeking to 
constrain minority rights thus have incentives to (explicitly or 
implicitly) provide information that highlights (or generates) 
animus toward the targeted group. Campaigns also have incen-
tives to appeal to negative stereotypes about the targeted 
group, and to highlight (and attack) counter-majoritarian ele-
ments of democratic institutions. The muted role of economic 
self-interest and the prominent role of group affect in decision 
making on these matters makes it, in a sense, rational for cam-
paigns seeking to constrain minority rights to use irrational 
appeals to fear, and to highlight threats presented by the mi-
nority made subject of the ballot question. 
72
 
ple’s vote, we need to pass this measure as a constitutional amendment to 
RESTORE THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE as a man and a woman.”). 
 Majority fear of and animosity toward minorities is a 
problem not simply for direct democracy, but for democracy 
generally. Classic studies of popular attitudes have established 
that the public’s initial response to questions about “out 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 8−44 comparing direct-democracy 
campaigns to candidate elections. 
 72. See Bell, supra note 3, at 13−22 (discussing the threat direct democra-
cy initiatives pose to racial and other discrete minorities); Linde, supra note 2, 
at 21 (expressing concern that “if a state permits lawmaking by statewide ini-
tiatives, their legitimate use must exclude measures for motives that the de-
signers of republican government most feared”). 
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groups” is almost universally intolerant.73 Moreover, white vot-
ers’ racial attitudes and racial animus have been shown to af-
fect how they vote in candidate contests.74 But my argument 
(which is by no means original) is that the role of anti-minority 
sentiments may be amplified by direct democracy, and that 
such sentiments will frequently cause minority rights to be de-
feated at the ballot box.75 Barbara S. Gamble demonstrated 
that initiatives targeting the civil rights of minorities passed at 
a much higher rate than initiatives on all other subjects.76 Don-
ald P. Haider-Markel and his colleagues also showed that gays 
and lesbians lost more often than they won when questions 
about their rights were decided by a public vote.77 Caroline J. 
Tolbert and Rodney E. Hero contend that the popularity of ini-
tiatives targeting minorities can be explained in terms of the 
threat that a diverse racial/ethnic context poses to white vot-
ers.78
 
 73. See, e.g., SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 26−48 (1955) (showing that, compared to the views of community 
leaders, the general public is usually much less tolerant of nonconformists, 
such as socialists and atheists). 
  
 74. See MENDELBERG, supra note 14, at 169−90 (showing the impact of 
implicit racial messages on voting patterns); KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR 
FEARS? 25−42 (1997) (citing studies that show a significant portion of white 
voters harbor negative attitudes toward black candidates); PAUL M. 
SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 88−109 (1993) (showing a 
correlation between negative racial stereotypes and opposition to race-
conscious initiatives such as fair housing or affirmative action).  
 75. See Bell, supra note 3, at 2 (“[T]he growing reliance on the referendum 
and initiative . . . creates a crisis for the rights of racial and other discrete mi-
norities.”); Linde, supra note 2, at 22−39 (tracing the history of direct demo c-
racy in the United States and its impact on minority rights). But see Todd Do-
novan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An Extension, 
42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1022 (1998) (showing that prior to the debate over 
marriage, voters, particularly those in larger jurisdictions, were often support-
ive of gay rights measures, and that direct democracy is not per se abusive of 
minorities). Haider-Markel et al. show that anti-gay outcomes became more 
common when marriage rights began being the subject of popular votes. See 
Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, Win, or Draw? A Reexamination of Di-
rect Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304, 307−11 (2007). 
 76. Gamble, supra note 65, at 258. 
 77. See Haider-Markel et al., supra note 75, at 307 (finding that the pro-
gay outcome in direct democracy contests was only 39%). It should be noted 
that Haider-Markel et al. also found that gays and lesbians lost regularly 
when their interests were decided in legislative votes. Id. 
 78. Caroline J. Tolbert & Rodney E. Hero, A Racial/Ethnic Diversity In-
terpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S., 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
851, 867 (1996) (arguing that consensuses develop in homogeneous states, but 
that “[w]here a predominant white . . . population coexists with substantial 
white ethnic and/or minority populations, social pluralism tends to increase 
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In sum, previous election results suggest that voters have 
not been sympathetic to minority rights and interests when 
questions affecting those issues were placed on ballots.79 In-
deed, knowledge of popular anti-minority sentiments may be 
one reason why elites use direct democracy to set policy. Exam-
ples of voter-approved ballot initiatives that restrict minority 
rights or target minorities for differential treatment are nu-
merous. Early in the twentieth century, Oklahomans approved 
an initiative that stripped voting rights from African Ameri-
cans.80 California voted to prohibit Asians from owning land,81 
and Arizonans passed an initiative that prohibited employment 
of immigrants.82 Since the 1960s, initiatives and referendums 
have been used to legislate on matters such as race-neutral ac-
cess to public accommodations, access to fair housing, school 
desegregation, and protections against discrimination in em-
ployment based on sexual orientation.83 Californians approved 
initiatives repealing fair access to housing.84 Voters in Arizona 
and other states made English an “official” language,85 and Col-
orado passed an initiative that prohibited extending anti-
discrimination protections to gays and lesbians,86 while voters 
in multiple states approved initiatives repealing applications of 
affirmative action when based on criteria of race and ethnici-
ty.87
 
political competition”). See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN 
STATE AND NATION (1949) (describing the political history of the southern 
states, highlighted largely by the desire of whites to maintain supremacy); Re-
gina Branton and Bradford Jones, Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Condi-
tional Relationship Between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment, 49 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 359 (2005) (discussing the racial threat hypothesis and arguing 
that it is influenced by the socioeconomic context). 
 
 79. See supra notes 72−78 and accompanying text. 
 80. The amendment established an educational requirement for voting, 
but in effect only applied it to blacks. CRONIN, supra note 68, at 92–93. 
 81. The Act targeted the expanding Japanese farm communities by pro-
hibiting ownership of land by corporations controlled by persons ineligible for 
naturalization. Id. at 93. 
 82. The initiative required at least 8% of employees of a company employ-
ing six or more people to be U.S. citizens. Id.  
 83. See Gamble, supra note 65, at 263–65 (listing several examples of each 
of these types of measures). 
 84. Id. at 255.  
 85. Id. at 260–61. 
 86. Id. at 260. 
 87. See generally, e.g., LYDIA CHÁVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S 
BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1998) (documenting the campaign and 
ultimate passage of Proposition 209, which banned public affirmative action 
programs in California); DANIEL MARTINEZ HOSANG, RACIAL PROPOSITIONS: 
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III.  MARRIAGE ON THE BALLOT   
Courts have effectively closed the door for citizen legisla-
tion on several of the minority-rights questions that previously 
appeared on state and local ballots. Procedures that allowed (or 
required) referendums on matters of fair housing,88 as well as 
law produced by referendums or initiative that repealed protec-
tions from racial discrimination,89 and initiated law that pro-
hibited school integration,90 have been found unconstitutional 
on equal-protection grounds. By the 1980s and 1990s, the mat-
ters of minority rights found most frequently on ballots in-
volved attempts to repeal, prevent, or (far less commonly) ad-
vance laws that protected people against discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.91 Between 1972 and 1996, at least 90 
measures dealing with civil rights of gays and lesbians ap-
peared on state and local ballots.92 Many of these were “no spe-
cial rights” measures93
 
BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE MAKING OF POSTWAR CALIFORNIA 201−41 (2010) 
(describing the passage and history behind Proposition 209). For other exam-
ples, see supra note 
 designed to permit discrimination (in 
64. 
 88. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (finding Akron, 
Ohio’s requirement for referendums on matters of race and housing a denial of 
equal protection). But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1971) 
(finding that a similar California referendum provision did not burden racial 
minorities). 
 89. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 386–87 (1967) (upholding a 
state-court decision that found California’s constitutional initiative repealing a 
fair-housing statute unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). But see Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 865 (4th 
Cir. 1968) (holding that submission of an open-housing act to the electorate for 
rejection or approval via referendum did not deny equal protection). 
 90. See Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486–87 
(1982) (finding that a statewide initiative to end Seattle’s mandatory school 
busing program unconstitutional because it was approved for racially motivat-
ed reasons).  
 91. See Gamble, supra note 65, at 245 (“Recently, ballot initiatives that 
seek to bar governments from passing laws that prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation have occupied a prominent place among the issues 
that have reached the ballot.”). In compiling various minority rights initia-
tives, Gamble found many more dealing with gay rights than other issues. See 
id. at 263−65. 
 92. See DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, FROM BULLHORNS TO PACS: LESBI-
AN AND GAY POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND POLICY 359−63 (1997) (listing 
these measures). 
 93. Most prominent among these were Measure 9 in Oregon (rejected by 
voters in 1992 with 56% opposed), Amendment 2 in Colorado (approved by 
voters in 1992), and Idaho Proposition 1 (rejected by voters in 1994). See Ballot 
History, supra note 66; Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995, supra 
note 66; 1994 Initiative General Election Results–Idaho, USELECTIONATLAS 
.ORG (May 23, 2007), http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=16& 
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employment) based on sexual orientation, but the list also in-
cludes a handful of measures dealing with AIDS.94 None of the-
se measures directly addressed the issue of marriage.95 When 
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that Colorado’s citizen-
initiated prohibition against protecting people from discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation amounted to a denial equal 
protection in Romer v. Evans,96 initiatives and referendums 
about sexual orientation discrimination largely disappeared 
from ballots.97
As a political matter, where earlier federal-court decisions 
ended cycles of direct legislation on questions about minority 
rights, Romer only altered the policy goals of political organiza-
tions opposed to gay rights—it did not prevent them from con-
tinuing to use the ballot to regulate the rights of gays and les-






 corresponded with the ongoing qualification of several 
ballot measures that would amend state constitutions to define 
marriage as a union between opposite-sex couples only. Voters 
in Hawaii amended their state’s constitution in 1998 in re-
sponse to a court ruling that questioned whether marriage 
could be reserved for opposite-sex couples given the equal pro-
 94. For a partial summary of ballot measures involving gay and lesbian 
rights, see Gamble, supra note 65, at 263–65; see also HAIDER-MARKEL, supra 
note 92, at 359−63; ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 17–106, 
127–32 (Stephanie L. Witt & Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997); Donovan & Bow-
ler, supra note 75, at 1020–24.  
 95. See HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 92, at 359−63. It is worth noting that 
few of the state-level “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA) statutes adopted in 
rapid succession in the 1990s and early 2000s were the result of the popular 
initiative process. For an overview of these statutes, see Defining Marriage: 
Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Law, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG-
ISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex 
-marriage-overview.aspx#2 (last updated Nov. 2012). 
 96. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The court ruled that anti-
discrimination laws did not extend “special rights” and that Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 was motivated by animus toward gays and lesbians, rather 
than a rational relationship to any legitimate function of government. Id. at 
631−33. 
 97. See HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 92, at 636 (showing a lack of ballot 
initiatives in 1997). 
 98. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that same-sex 
marriage is not a fundamental right under the Hawaii constitution, but that 
statutes restricting it to male-female marriage must be subject to strict scruti-
ny); see also Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996) (denying church and 
clergy members’ request to intervene, holding that their right to solemnize on-
ly marriages that fit their beliefs would not be infringed if same-sex marriage 
was allowed). 
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tection clause of that state’s constitution.99 Voters in Alaska 
approved a constitutional amendment banning same-sex mar-
riage that same year.100 By the late 1990s, social conservative 
groups shifted emphasis from anti-discrimination laws to mar-
riage and adoption laws.101 Focus on the Family mobilized con-
tributors in 1999 by emphasizing the threat of gay and lesbian 
adoption, and the danger of teaching of same-sex marriage and 
tolerance of gay and lesbian clubs in public schools.102
Same-sex marriage as a ballot issue gained added momen-
tum in 2003 after the Supreme Court of Massachusetts directed 
the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
 
103 A 
national coalition of religious conservative groups, including 
Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council, formed 
in early 2004 “to defend traditional marriage in the wake of a 
court decision requiring marriage or marriage-type rights for 
homosexual couples.”104 Conservative activists qualified anti-
gay marriage initiatives in six states (Arkansas, Montana, 
Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon) and state legisla-
tors placed constitutional amendments barring same-sex mar-
riage on the ballot in seven others in 2004 (Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah).105 
Eleven of these votes occurred in conjunction with the Novem-
ber 2 presidential election.106 Every measure was approved, 
usually with large super-majorities in support.107
 
 99. Question 2, Legislative Power to Reserve Marriage to Opposite Sex 
Couples Act. See supra note 
  
69. This amendment was approved with 69.2% 
support. Election Summary Report, HAWAII.GOV (Nov. 4, 1998), http://hawaii 
.gov/elections/results/1998/general/98swgen.pdf. 
 100. Alaska’s Marriage Amendment (Measure 2) was approved with 68% 
support. Election Summary Report, ST. ALASKA DIVISION ELECTIONS (Dec. 1, 
1998), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/98GENR/results.htm. 
 101. See Todd Donovan et al., Direct Democracy and Gay Rights Initiatives 
After Romer, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 161, 169 (Craig A. Rimmerman 
et al. eds., 2000) (discussing how antigay activists began to move to more in-
cremental policy proposals that could be marketed as maintaining the status 
quo). 
 102. Id. at 180.  
 103. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 104. Volume 2, Issue 1: “Coalition for Marriage” Formed to Advocate “One 
Man One Woman Marriage”, MICH. FAM. FORUM ONLINE (Jan. 7, 2004), http:// 
www.michiganfamily.org/main-resources/Forum%20Online%20Archive/2004/ 
fo-01-07-04.htm. 
 105. See Todd Donovan et al., Did Gay Marriage Elect George W. Bush? 
5−6 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://polisci.msu.edu/sppc2005/ 
papers/fripm/dtsp_sppc05.pdf (presented at the State Politics & Policy Confer-
ence, East Lansing, Michigan, May 14–15, 2005). 
 106. Only Louisiana’s and Missouri’s votes occurred in earlier primary 
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In 2004, most campaigns against same-sex marriage were 
low-budget operations, yet they nonetheless had the capacity to 
contact many voters.108 Campaigns against same-sex marriage 
collected signatures in and out of churches, and used grassroots 
volunteers and churches to distribute campaign literature.109 
The Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage began collecting signa-
tures in May 2004, submitting 575,000 signatures by August 
2004.110 In Michigan, Citizens for the Protection of Marriage 
sponsored a petition drive to place a constitutional amendment 
on that state’s November 2004 ballot and distributed one mil-
lion fliers in support of it.111 In Oregon, the Defense of Marriage 
Coalition and the Oregon Family Council began collecting sig-
natures in late May 2004. The Coalition collected 244,000 sig-
natures to qualify the Oregon amendment by July.112
Contacts with voters were not limited to petitioning. The 
Ohio campaign placed over 3.3 million phone calls (in a state 
where 5.6 million citizens cast votes) featuring Ohio’s Republi-
can Secretary of State (who co-chaired Bush’s state election 
campaign) to promote Issue 1.
  
113 The Arkansas “Yes on 
Amendment 3” campaign gathered 200,000 signatures and led 
a powerful church-based campaign.114
 
elections. See id. at 5 n.2. 
 The Detroit Free Press 
reported that African-American voters in Michigan received 
thousands of “robo calls” urging them to vote for John Kerry in 
order to promote the Democrats’ goal of defending gay mar-
 107. States voting in November included Arkansas (Amendment 3, 75% 
yes), Georgia (Question 1, 76% yes), Kentucky (75% yes), Michigan (Proposal 
2, 59% yes), Mississippi (Amendment 1, 86% yes), Montana (Measure CI—96, 
67% yes), North Dakota (73% yes), Oklahoma (Question 711, 76% yes), Ohio 
(Issue 1, 62% yes), Oregon (Measure 36, 57% yes), and Utah (66% yes). Louisi-
ana approved a ban on same-sex marriage at the September 18 primary 
(Amendment 1, 78% yes), while Missouri approved a Marriage Definition 
Amendment at the August 3 primary (71% yes). Id. 
 108. Id. at 6. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Patricia Montemurri & Marisol Bello, Proposal 2: Marriage Ban Di-
vides, Unites Religions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 21, 2004, at A3.  
 112. Sandeep Kaushik, Gay Marriage Backers Focus on Ore. Battle, BOS. 
GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2004, at A3.  
 113. Jim Siegell, Media Blitz Begins for Ohio’s Issue 1, CINCINNATI EN-
QUIRER, Oct. 26, 2004.  
 114. Jay Barth & Janine Parry, Arkansas: Still Swingin’ in 2004, in READ-
INGS IN ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 361, 368 (Janine A. Parry & 
Richard P. Wang eds., 2009). 
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riage.115 Proponents of the 2004 Michigan marriage ban spent 
nearly $2 million on their campaign, with the Catholic Church 
and the Family Research Council providing most of the fund-
ing.116
Most campaigns in 2004 featured very little spending by 
supporters or opponents of same-sex marriage, with nine of 
thirteen states that year having less than $100,000 in total 
spending.
  
117 Total spending by groups opposed to and support-
ing same-sex marriage in most states in 2004 amounted to less 
than twelve cents per member of the voting-age population.118 
This low value likely reflects that campaigns in favor of mar-
riage bans were conducted via churches,119 and that opponents 
of same-sex marriage bans failed to mount substantial opposi-
tion campaigns in 2004.120
No single election year since 2004 has included as many 
state-wide votes on same-sex marriage, but two additional 
votes were held in 2005, nine more in 2006, three states voted 
on marriage in 2008, two in 2009, and five voted on marriage in 
  
 
 115. “‘When you vote this Tuesday, remember to legalize gay marriage by 
supporting John Kerry,’ the call said. ‘It’s what we all want. It’s a basic Demo-
cratic principle.’” Kathleen Gray, Presidential Campaigns, Voters Upset About 
Misleading Calls, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 1, 2004 (on file with author).  
 116. Church funding came from the Archdiocese of Detroit, and the Diocese 
of Lansing, Grand Rapids, Saginaw, Gaylord, Kalamazo, and Marquette. See 
Dawn Wolfe, Catholics Against Equality: Michigan Catholics Give $1 Million 
to Hurt LGBT Families Nov. 2, PRIDESOURCE: BETWEEN THE LINES (Jan. 
27, 2005), http://www.pridesource.com/article.html?article=11275. 
 117. See SUE O’CONNELL, THE INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., THE MONEY BE-
HIND THE 2004 MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS 5 (2006), available at http://www 
.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200601271.pdf (showing that Kentucky, 
Missouri, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Mississippi, 
and North Dakota all had total contributions under $100,000). 
 118. The author’s calculations are based on data from the National Insti-
tute on Money in State Politics. See id. (showing the total contribution 
amounts by state). State voting age populations come from Michael McDon-
ald’s United States Elections Project at George Mason University. See Michael 
McDonald, 2004 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTION PROJECT, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2004G.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2011). 
 119. See generally David E. Campbell & J. Quin Monson, The Religion 
Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 
399 (2008) (discussing the mobilization of religious groups during the 2004 
campaigns). 
 120. In 2004, Oregon ($5,368,452 total spending, or $1.96 per citizen over 
18 years old), was an exception to this. A modest campaign against bans on 
same-sex marriage in 2004 also occurred in Utah (where opponents spent 
$0.47 per citizen over 18). For data behind these calculations, see O’CONNELL, 
supra note 117, and McDonald, supra note 118. 
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2012.121 By 2006, several state-level campaigns over gay mar-
riage had far more funding from individual contributions on 
both sides than in 2004.122 In several states where there was 
substantial campaign spending, proponents of same-sex mar-
riage heavily outspent opponents (these cases included Wiscon-
sin in 2006,123 Arizona in 2006,124 Colorado in 2006,125 California 
in 2008,126 Florida in 2008,127 Maine in 2009,128 North Carolina 
in 2012,129 Maine in 2012,130 Minnesota in 2012,131
 
 121. Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnerships on the Ballot, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2012, 5:10 AM), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
legislatures-elections/elections/same-sex-marriage-on-the-ballot.aspx. 
 and Wash-
 122. MEGAN MOORE, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE MON-
EY BEHIND THE 2006 MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS 4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200707231.pdf; see O’CONNELL, supra 
note 117, at 5. 
 123. Opponents of the same-sex marriage ban in Wisconsin outspent pro-
ponents by 6:1. Statistical results are on file with the author. 
 124. Opponents of the same-sex marriage ban in Arizona outspent propo-
nents by nearly 2:1. Id. 
 125. Colorado had two ballot measures related to marriage in 2006. 
Amendment 43 proposed to ban same-sex marriage, and Referendum I pro-
posed recognizing domestic partnerships. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, RESEARCH PUB. NO. 554, ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 BALLOT 
PROPOSALS 13, 22, 34, 40 (2006). Supporters of Referendum I outspent oppo-
nents by nearly 5:1. Opponents of Amendment 43 likewise outspent propo-
nents by nearly 4:1. Nonetheless, Amendment 43 passed, and Referendum I 
was defeated. Statistical results are on file with the author. 
 126. Opponents of California’s Prop. 8 outspent proponents by 1.5:1. Id. 
 127. Opponents of the same-sex marriage ban in Florida outspent propo-
nents by 2.7:1. Id. 
 128. Opponents of Maine’s veto of same-sex marriage outspent proponents 
by 1.7:1, and spent the equivalent of $6.25 per person over 18 years of age. Id.; 
see also TYLER EVILSIZER, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, THE 
MONEY BEHIND THE MAINE MARRIAGE MEASURE 1 (2009), available at http:// 
www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=404.  
 129. Opponents of North Carolina’s ban on same-sex marriage outspent 
proponents 1.8:1. Statistical results are on file with the author; see also 
Amendment 1 (Primary): Same-Sex Marriage Ban, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. 
POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m= 
944 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 130. Supporters of Maine’s initiative to allow same-sex marriage outspent 
opponents 3:1. Statistical results are on file with the author. See also Question 
1: This Measure Would Repeal Maines [sic] Current Same Sex Marriage Ban, 
NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/database/ 
StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=955 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 131. Opponents of Minnesota’s ban on same-sex marriage outspent propo-
nents 9.6:1. Statistical results are on file with the author; see also Minnesota 
Marriage Amendment: Would Amend the Minnesota Constitution to Prohibit 
Gay Marriages, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., http://www.followthemoney 
.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=953 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
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ington in 2012132). This funding reflected a movement to far 
greater spending on TV advertising after 2004, particularly by 
supporters of same-sex marriage.133 Spending over California’s 
Proposition 8 in 2008—largely a battle of TV ads—topped $100 
million.134 In terms of spending per eligible voter, the 2009 ini-
tiative campaign in Maine to veto a same-sex marriage law 
dwarfed what was spent on Proposition 8 in California ($9.98 
per voter in Maine,135 compared to $3.02 per voter on Proposi-
tion 8136
Despite high spending against attempts to ban same-sex 
marriage in states noted above, proponents of marriage bans 
generally did not need to spend much to win.
).  
137 A simple ordi-
nary least-squares regression analysis of the relationship be-
tween election results from 2004 to 2012 (percent state vote in 
favor of banning same-sex marriage) and spending reveals an 
inverse relationship between campaign expenditures and vot-
ing. Where more was spent—either in total, by the yes side, or 
by the no side—a higher proportion of votes were cast in favor 
of banning same-sex marriage.138
 
 132. Supporters of Washington’s referendum to allow same-sex marriage 
outspent opponents 5.3:1. Statistical results are on file with the author; Refer-
endum 74: Allowing Same-Sex Marriage, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=947 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 The inverse association be-
 133. See, e.g., Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Minnesota Sees Record Spending 
on Ballot Issues, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/ 
politics/statelocal/176524841.html?refer=y. 
 134. Proposition 008: Limit On Marriage, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=485 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013); John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 Supporters Fight Fierce 
TV Ad Battle, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 11, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/ 
Prop-8-supporters-fight-fierce-TV-ad-battle-3190723.php. 
 135. See EVILSIZER, supra note 128, at 2; November 3, 2009 General Elec-
tion Tabulations: People’s Veto and Referendum Questions, MAINE.GOV, http:// 
www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html (last visited Apr. 
2, 2013). 
 136. See Peter Quist, The Money Behind the 2008 Same-Sex Partnership 
Ballot Measures, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL. (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www 
.followthemoney.org/press/PrintReportView.phtml?r=406; CAL. SEC’Y OF 
STATE DEBRA BROWN, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL 
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008 
-general/sov_complete.pdf. 
 137. The rare exceptions to this occurred in Arizona (2008), where mar-
riage ban supporters outspent opponents by 7:1, and California, where mar-
riage ban supporters were heavily outspent, but nonetheless managed to 
spend $42,000,000 ($1.54 per voter). Statistical results are on file with the au-
thor; see also QUIST, supra note 136.  
 138. Full statistical results are available from the author. The slope be-
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tween yes-side spending and vote support likely reflects endog-
enous effects associated with the states, rather than yes-side 
spending reducing vote share. That is, proponents of banning 
same-sex marriage had little reason to spend on television ad-
vertising in heavily conservative states where the ban was sure 
to pass (such as Mississippi and Alabama), while they had 
much more need to spend in liberal states like Maine, Oregon, 
or California, where passage of the marriage bans was less cer-
tain.139
As of January 2013, the issue had appeared on state bal-
lots thirty-nine times (in thirty-one different states).
 
140 Prior to 
2012, thirty-one states had voted on same-sex marriage, and 
thirty-two had rejected it.141 Up until 2012, marriage bans were 
uniformly approved (or marriage equality rejected), regardless 
of the amount of money spent by rival campaigns.142 This pat-
tern changed in 2012 when voters in three states (Maine, Mary-
land, and Washington) approved measures allowing same-sex 
marriage, and voters in Minnesota rejected a ban on same-sex 
marriage.143 In at least three of these states, supporters of mar-
riage equality outspent opponents.144
 
tween state level spending against same-sex marriage across 33 states (dollars 
per person) and percent of state vote against same-sex marriage was -6.5 (p 
<.014, R2 = .18). The slope between state level spending for same-sex marriage 
(dollars per person) and percent of vote against marriage was -4.8 (p <.003, 
R2=.26). The slope between total spending (dollars per person) and percent of 
state vote against marriage was -3.1 (p <.003, R2 .25).  
  
 139. For a discussion of endogeneity and campaign spending on ballot 
measures, see generally Thomas Stratmann, Is Spending More Potent for or 
Against a Proposition? Evidence from Ballot Measures, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 788 
(2006). 
 140. See Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnerships on the Ballot, su-
pra note 121. 
 141. Id. Arizona rejected a ban on same-sex marriage in 2006, but ap-
proved a ban in 2008. Id.  
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Darrin Hurwitz, What the Money Gap in the 2012 Marriage Ballot 
Measures Means for the Future of LGBT Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 
2012, 7:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/darrin-hurwitz/what-the 
-money-gap-in-the-2012-marriage-ballot-measures-means-for-the-future-of 
-lgbt-equality_b_2220629.html?utm_hp_ref=email_share (reporting that each 
anti-same-sex marriage campaign was significantly outspent by opponents in 
2012); Annie Linskey, Last-Minute Checks Keep Same-Sex Marriage Cam-
paign Alive, BALT. SUN (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.baltimoresun 
.com/news/maryland/politics/blog/bal-last-minute-checks-keep-samesex 
-marriage-campaign-alive-20121127,0,3476121.story (stating that supporters 
of same-sex marriage outraised and outspent opponents of same-sex marriage 
by more than two to one). 
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A. LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS AS A THREAT TO THE MAJORITY 
From 1998 to 2010, opponents of same-sex marriage may 
not have needed to spend as much as supporters, in part be-
cause public opinion was largely on their side,145 and in part be-
cause of their ability to effectively portray a minority right as a 
threat to the majority.146 Campaigns to ban same-sex marriage 
generated information about a threat (to the heterosexual ma-
jority) posed by gays and lesbians, as well as attacks on “activ-
ist” courts.147 Placing questions about rights on the ballot corre-
sponds with campaigns and events that stigmatize the minority 
group made subject to the debate.148 A discussion of a minority-
rights question during a campaign need not be framed with ma-
levolent language in order to stigmatize the targeted group. 
Campaigns against a particular right may be framed with be-
nevolent, neutral, or malevolent language. As examples, ballot 
measures that proposed repealing protections against job dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation were couched in terms 
of “no special rights.”149 Likewise, rather than mentioning af-
firmative action in their titles, initiatives repealing such pro-
grams emphasized that they were promoting the equal applica-
tion of “civil rights.”150
Yet the presence of these measures on a state’s ballot gen-
erates information about why the initiative is needed—
  
 
 145. Gallup public opinion surveys found majorities opposed to “marriages 
between same-sex couples” from 1996 to 2010. Gallup’s 2011 survey, however, 
was its first survey since it began tracking the issue to find a majority in sup-
port of same-sex marriage. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Ameri-
cans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup 
.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx. 
 146. Helene Slessarev-Jamir, Religious Conservatives’ Success in Con-
structing Gay Marriage as a Threat to Religious Liberties 3 (2012) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2107976## (American Political Science Association 2012 Annual 
Meeting paper). 
 147. See, e.g., Protecting Traditional Marriage, AM. CENTER FOR LAW & 
JUST., http://aclj.org/marriage/protecting-traditional-marriage (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (arguing that “[a]ctivist courts and zealous political leaders are 
engaging in an aggressive campaign to alter the landscape of marriage”). 
 148. See Resolution on Opposing Discriminatory Legislation & Initiatives 
Aimed at Lesbian, Gay & Bisexual Persons, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www 
.apa.org/about/policy/discriminatory-legislation.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 149. See Suzanne McCorkle & Marshall G. Most, The Idaho Anti-Gay Initi-
ative: A Chronology of Events, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 51, 54–
55. See generally Samuel A. Marcosson, The “Special Rights” Canard in the 
Debate over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 137 (1995) (exploring the concept of “special rights”). 
 150. CHÁVEZ, supra note 87, at 126–27.  
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information that can contain explicit or implicit anti-minority 
appeals.151 Although anti-minority themes may also surround 
discussions of the same minority-rights question in non-
initiative states, direct democracy can act as a vehicle that gen-
erates additional information and media attention that ex-
pands the scope of conflict over the question—beyond what it 
would be in states where it was not put to a popular vote.152 
Stephen P. Nicholson, an American politics scholar, has 
demonstrated that above and beyond the effects of initiative 
campaign spending and media attention, voters are significant-
ly more aware of ballot measures involving rights and morality 
questions than they are of other measures.153 Nicholson notes 
that ballot questions about morality and rights tap into core 
values and deeply held beliefs154 that provide for “easy” issue 
voting associated with “gut responses.”155 Surveys also demon-
strate that voters were aware of gay-marriage measures when 
they appeared on their state’s ballot.156
An overview of the content of political advertising from di-
rect-democracy campaigns against same-sex marriage illus-
trates how marriage rights for lesbians and gays were por-
trayed as a threat. Conservative Christian organizations active 
in politics—such as Focus on the Family (FOTF) and The Fami-
  
 
 151. See generally MENDELBERG, supra note 14 (analyzing racially-loaded 
implicit and explicit communication in the context of campaign strategy). 
 152. Gamble, supra note 65, at 249. For a discussion on the general concept 
of expanding the scope of political conflict, see generally E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960). 
 153. For example, over 90% of California voters reported being aware of 
Proposition 187 in 1994 (denying benefits to illegal aliens), and 86% were 
aware of Proposition 209 in 1996 (repealing affirmative action). This is higher 
than awareness surrounding some of California’s more famous initiatives, in-
cluding the term limit initiative Proposition 140 in 1992 (67% aware), and 
Proposition 103, the successful auto insurance initiative of 1988 (57% aware). 
Stephen P. Nicholson, The Political Environment and Ballot Proposition 
Awareness, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 405–08 (2003).  
 154. Id. at 407. 
 155. Carmines & Stimson, supra note 39, at 78. 
 156. A 2004 Pew national survey found that 42% of respondents said they 
were aware of initiatives and referendums on their November ballot. In states 
where gay marriage was on the ballot, “gay marriage” and “gay rights” were 
the second most common responses to an open-ended follow-up question ask-
ing “[c]an you think of any particular issues on the ballot.” Twenty-six percent 
offered these unprompted responses in those states. Press Release, Pew Re-
search Ctr. for the People & the Press, Democrats, Blacks Less Confident in 
Accurate Vote Count: Race Tightens Again, Kerry’s Image Improves 9, 26 (Oct. 
20, 2004), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/229.pdf. 
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ly Research Council (FRC)—presented the threat of same-sex 
marriage argument explicitly.157 The FRC promoted the idea 
that same-sex marriage threatened straight relationships be-
cause it would “probably undercut the norm of sexual fidelity in 
marriage,” “undercut the procreative norm long associated with 
marriage,” and foster “an anti-natalist mindset that fuels popu-
lation decline.”158 FOTF advocated that the “‘homosexual rights’ 
ideology” will result “in changing societal mores and values 
that deeply impact Americans in their day-to-day relationships 
with family members, neighbors and co-workers.”159
In campaign advertisements, the threat of same-sex mar-
riage was regularly presented as a slippery slope. In 2004, the 
Republican National Committee sent direct mail to Arkansas 
voters linking gay marriage to “The Liberal Agenda,” and im-
plied that if same-sex marriages were to occur in Arkansas that 
the Bible would be banned
 
160 (presumably by liberal homosexu-
als). A TV ad from Oregon’s 2004 campaign in favor of a consti-
tutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage likewise pre-
sented the slippery slope, albeit less overtly, by posing the 
question, “If we don’t protect marriage now, what’s next? Will 
marriage mean anything in the future?”161
 
 157. See Glenn Stanton, How We Dishonor God in Our Sex Lives, FOCUS ON 
FAM., http://www.focusonthefamily.com/marriage/sex_and_intimacy/gods_ 
design_for_sex/how_we_dishonor_god_in_our_sex_lives.aspx (last visited Apr. 
2, 2013); Human Sexuality, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/ 
human-sexuality#homosexuality (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 In recent same-sex 
 158. Ten Arguments from Social Science Against Same Sex Marriage, FAM. 
RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=if04g01. The FRC was active in 
the 2004 same-sex marriage campaigns, California’s Prop. 8 campaign of 2008, 
the 2009 Maine campaign against same-sex marriage, and the 2010 judicial 
recall campaign targeting Iowa Supreme Court justices who had ruled in favor 
of marriage rights. See O’CONNELL, supra note 117, at 3; EVILSIZER, supra 
note 128, at 2; Linda Casey, Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa 
Topple Three High Court Justices, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL. (Jan. 10, 
2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=440.  
 159. Revisionist Gay Theology, FOCUS ON FAM., http://www 
.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/social-issues/progay-revisionist-theology 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). In 2004 the 501(c)(4) arm of Focus on the 
Family was active in anti-same-sex marriage campaigns in Arkansas, Georgia, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, and Oregon. About FRC Action, FRC 
ACTION, http://www.frcaction.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 2, 2013); see also 
O’CONNELL, supra note 117, at 16. 
 160. Letter from Republican Nat’l Comm. to Arkansas Voters (2004) (on 
file with author). 
 161. Defense of Marriage Coalition: Yes on 36-Oregon Constitutional 
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marriage campaigns, voters have been told via paid advertise-
ments that second-grade children were being taught that boys 
can marry boys and girls can marry girls,162 and that elemen-
tary-school students were being forced to watch lesbian wed-
dings.163
Nearly all advertising in the 2004 through 2012 election 
cycles avoided explicitly disparaging homosexuality or homo-
sexuals. Moreover, claims in several ads about the dire conse-
quences of same-sex marriage were often supported with refer-




Rather than expressly attacking homosexuality, viewers 
were told about dire secondary consequences of same-sex mar-
riage. An ominous 2008 National Organization for Marriage
 Two themes in these ads are readily identifiable, 
however, each defining minority rights as a threat to the major-
ity: (1) same-sex marriage was shown to threaten straight peo-
ple and their children; and (2) same-sex marriage reflected an 
attack on the majority by special interests and activist judges 
who could not be trusted. 
165 
ad warned, “There’s a storm gathering, the clouds are dark and 
the winds are strong,” with actors claiming that “advocates of 
same-sex marriage” will take away a young woman’s freedom, 
forced a California doctor to choose between her faith and her 
job, and used “government” to “punish” a New Jersey church 
group.166
 
 162. See Stand for Marriage Me., Everything to Do with Schools, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FijVUbUlV3s; Preserve 
Marriage Washington, Reject Referendum 74 TV Ad–“Schools Could Teach”, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yWmSwLk9MA; 
ProtectMarriage.com, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Everything to Do with Schools, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7352ZVMKBQM& 
feature=relmfu. 
 In the same ad an actor playing a Massachusetts par-
ent says that she is “helplessly watching public schools teach 
my son that gay marriage is okay.” “Some who advocate for 
 163. Protectmarriage.com, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Truth, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l61Pd5_jHQw. 
 164. See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 165. The National Organization for Marriage was a major funder of the 
2008 Yes on Prop. 8 campaign in California, along with Focus on the Family 
and the Knights of Columbus. QUIST, supra note 136. The National Organiza-
tion for Marriage was also a major funder of Maine’s 2009 Yes on 1 campaign, 
as was the Roman Catholic Diocese of Portland. EVILSIZER, supra note 128, at 
2–3. 
 166. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Gathering Storm TV Ad, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wp76ly2_NoI. 
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same-sex marriage,” viewers were told, will change how 
straight people live, and leave them “no choice.”167
The threat of same-sex marriage to children is made explic-
it. The 2012 campaign in favor of Maine’s Initiative Question 2 
claimed “social science”
 
168 proves that “‘children will pay a se-
vere price’ - with lifelong consequences - if marriage in Maine is 
redefined.”169 Consequences (offered without any causal logic) 
were said to include children growing up in poverty, increased 
juvenile delinquency, and “drug use, increased risk of teen 
pregnancy, higher dropout rates, lower educational attainment, 
poorer physical and emotional health, etc.”170
Voters are exposed to such claims not only via paid adver-
tising, but through opinion pieces published in local newspa-
pers,
  
171 and through communications from religious officials.172
 
 167. Id. Rather than referring to gays or lesbians, beneficiaries of the fa-
vorable treatment for gays and lesbians are referred to repeatedly as “advo-
cates.” Perhaps by coincidence, The Advocate is a prominent LGBT publica-
tion. See ADVOCATE, http://www.advocate.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
 
 168. The Family Research Council, National Organization for Marriage, 
and various campaigns cite a study by University of Texas sociologist Mark 
Regnerus, as evidence that children raised by gay parents are worse off than 
children raised by a married mother and father. Andy Birkey, Gay Marriage 
Foes Tout Conservative-Backed Parenting Study, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 
2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/21/gay-marriage 
-parenting-study_n_1614226.html. The Regnerus study may be problematic, 
as it compares children from intact, two parent families to children from fami-
lies that may not have been intact. See generally Mark Regnerus, How Differ-
ent Are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have Same-Sex Relationships? 
Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 752, 752–
70 (2012). Dr. Regnerus’ curriculum vitae states he has received $785,000 in 
research funding from the Witherspoon Institute and the Bradley Foundation, 
two socially conservative organizations. See Mark Regnerus, Curriculum Vitae 
5 (Jan. 2013), available at www.utexas.edu/cola/files/2829874. The National 
Organization for Marriage is reported to have been co-founded by an individu-
al who also founded Witherspoon and serves on the Bradley Board. See Birkey, 
supra.  
 169. Joe Garofoli, Strategist Behind Proposition 8 Is Loved, Feared, S.F. 
CHRON. (July 5, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/ 
Strategist-behind-Proposition-8-is-loved-feared-3687342.php (quoting 
ProtectMarriageMain.com). Similar claims about effects on children estab-
lished by social science were also made in the Minnesota 2012 campaign 
against same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Autumn Leva, Op-Ed., Marriage 
Amendment: Vote Yes, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://www 
.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/175003381.html?refer=y (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013). 
 170. Consequences of Redefining Marriage, supra note 169. 
 171. See, e.g., David Anderson, Reject Referendum 74: Redefining Marriage 
Threatens Children, Business, Liberties, BELLINGHAM HERALD (Oct. 21, 2012), 
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But TV ads provide rich illustrations of how the right to mar-
riage is portrayed in paid and unpaid media as a threat. The 
threat to children played a prominent role in campaigns di-
rected by political strategist Frank Schubert.173 The 2009 Maine 
campaign to repeal a legislatively enacted same-sex marriage 
statute and California’s 2008 Prop. 8 campaign to nullify a 
state-court ruling in favor of same-sex marriage featured near-
ly identical TV ads that stressed that “homosexual marriage” 
has “everything to do with schools.”174 Each ad featured Robb 
and Robin Wirthlin, a couple from Massachusetts who claimed 
their second-grade son was being taught that “boys can marry 
other boys.”175 In each ad, the couple claims, “We tried to stop 
public schools from teaching children about gay marriage, but 
the court said we had no right to object or pull him out of 
class.”176 The Wirthlins’ claim about the court ruling against 
them is bolstered with an on-screen citation to Parker v. Hur-
ley, a case in which the First Circuit upheld a decision that 
dismissed the Wirthlins’ challenge to a Massachusetts district’s 
use of a children’s picture book that features a prince falling in 
love with a prince.177
B. JUDGES AS A THREAT TO THE MAJORITY 
 
Additional TV ads combined the threat to children with an 
anti-judicial, majoritarian theme. Californians were informed 
 
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2012/10/21/2736869/no-on-referendum-74-
redefining.html#storylink=misearch. This article used the same themes from 
the Maine campaign (and other campaigns) to argue against Referendum 74. 
 172. See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Archbishop Nienstedt’s Latest Marriage-
Amendment Letter Adds to Catholic Turmoil, MINNPOST (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2012/08/archbishop-nienstedts-latest-
marriage-amendment-letter-adds-catholic-turmoil. 
 173. Schubert directed the 2008 Yes on Prop. 8 campaign in California and 
the 2009 Yes on Question 1 campaign in Maine. Jesse McKinley, California 
Companies Fight Same-Sex Marriage Nationwide, Dec. 13, 2009, N.Y. TIMES, 
at A30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13marriage.html. 
In 2012 he directed the No on Referendum 74 campaign in Washington, the 
Yes on Amendment 1 campaign in Minnesota, the No on Question 6 campaign 
in Maryland, and the No on Question 1 campaign in Maine. See Gay Marriage: 
Turning the Tide, ECONOMIST (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21562975. 
 174. Stand for Marriage Me., supra note 162; ProtectMarriage.com, Yes on 
8 TV Ad: Everything to Do with Schools, supra note 162. The Maine ad fea-
tured a white woman as a school teacher, while the California ad had a Latina 
portray the teacher. 
 175. See supra note 174. 
 176. See supra note 174. 
 177. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 93, 107 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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that “four judges ignored 4 million voters and imposed same-
sex marriage.”178 In the same ad, Pepperdine University School 
of Law Professor Richard Peterson told viewers that as a result 
of the California Supreme Court, acceptance of gay marriage in 
California was now mandatory, and that people were now being 
sued over their personal beliefs,179 with “gay marriage taught in 
public schools.”180 A nearly identical TV ad broadcast in Maine 
told viewers that “special interests got the legislature to ap-
prove homosexual marriage, and tried to prevent Mainers from 
voting. But Question 1 gives us our vote.”181 The same Maine ad 
featured Boston College Law School Professor Scott T. Fitzgib-
bon, who informed viewers that unless Question 1 passes, there 
would be a “flood of lawsuits against individuals, small busi-
nesses, and religious groups”182 with “homosexual marriage 
taught in public schools whether parents like it or not.”183 A 
2010 ad in Minnesota also claimed “special interests” were 
“pushing judges and DFL politicians to impose gay marriage on 
Minnesota” and that “most DFL lawmakers don’t want you to 
have a say.”184
 
 178. ProtectMarriage.com, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Whether You Like It or Not, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kKn5LNhNto& 
feature=relmfu. 
 Another California ad from 2008 stressed that 
same-sex marriage “was forced on us by San Francisco judges 
when gay domestic partners already have the same legal 
rights” and asked viewers to “think about” what same-sex mar-
riage meant to religious freedoms and to children being taught 
 179. Id. The screenshot supporting this claim displayed the California 
State Supreme Court’s August 18, 2008 decisions in North Coast Women’s 
Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, a unanimous 
2008 California Supreme Court decision finding that doctors must offer fertili-
zation services to lesbians and gays even if doing so poses an incidental con-
flict with the doctor’s religious beliefs, or find another physician who will do 
so. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 189 
P.3d 959, 970 (Cal. 2008). 
 180. The screen displayed the “Parker v. Hurley” citation during this claim. 
ProtectMarriage.com, supra note 178. 
 181. Stand for Marriage Me., First Maine Yes on 1 Ad, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1U7bs5yHJv4.  
 182. Id. A citation to “Elane Photography v. Willock (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. 
Ct.)” appears on screen during this claim. Id. The New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals upheld that case and ruled the state’s anti-discrimination statute pro-
hibited discrimination in public accommodations such as wedding photog-
raphy. Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 445 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 183. A citation to “Parker v. Hurley” appears on screen during this claim. 
Stand for Marriage Me., supra note 181. 
 184. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Your Right to Vote Minnesota - Gay Marriage, 
YOUTUBE (May 18, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lb_oXczrDQo. 
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about same-sex marriage in school.185 Oregon’s 2004 campaign 
for a constitutional marriage amendment also featured claims 
about “activist judges are trying to overrule Oregon law by 
sanctioning same-sex marriages.”186
Several other ads avoided presenting same-sex marriage as 
direct threat to children, but featured gauzy images of smiling 
straight couples with young children.
 
187 In addition to demon-
strating what “normal” families should look like and “what is 
best for children,” these ads also emphasized the threat of the 
judicial branch.188 One such ad from the 2004 Michigan cam-
paign emphasized that the proposed constitutional amendment 
on marriage was needed to stop “judges from changing what is 
already the state law” and that judges do not have the right to 
“redefine marriage for everybody else . . . voting yes lets the 
people decide.”189 A similar 2012 TV ad informed North Caroli-
na viewers that marriage has been one man and one woman, 
because “it’s what God created to give children a mother and a 
father.”190 The ad then switched to a majoritarian appeal, and 
without irony, claimed that “by defining marriage in the state 
constitution, only voters can determine what marriage 
means.”191
 
 185. ProtectMarriage.com, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Have You Thought About It?, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 29, 2008) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YRQZwNfQ0o& 
feature=relmfu.  
 In other words, North Carolina voters could define 
(or change) God’s will, not judges or legislators. 
 186. Def. of Marriage Coal., Yes on 36-Oregon Constitutional Amendment, 
COMMERCIAL CLOSET, http://www.commercialcloset.org/common/adlibrary/ 
adlibrarydetails.cfm?QID=2023&ClientID=11064 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 187. See, e.g., Minnesota for Marriage, First Minnesota For Marriage TV 
Ad: Good of Marriage, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=5z3QkveDGNk. 
 188. See id. (advocating for a marriage amendment so that “only voters can 
determine the definition of marriage”). 
 189. This language is taken from a 2004 Michigan TV ad produced by sev-
eral religious officials that was reported to have been broadcast by the Ameri-
can Family Association of Michigan. Am. Family Ass’n of Mich., TV Ad for 
Michigan’s Marriage Protection Amendment (2004), YOUTUBE (Sept. 15, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p7JCJsQ5Jg . 
 190. Vote for Marriage NC, Vote for Marriage NC’s Pro-Amendment One 
TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
TPY5mZt6aL8. 
 191. Id.  
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C. APPEALS TO STEREOTYPES IN DIRECT-DEMOCRACY 
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST RIGHTS 
Contemporary campaigns against marriage rights for les-
bian and gay couples lack the explicit hostility directed toward 
homosexuals that was found from the 1970s to 1990s. As ex-
amples, a 1992 Oregon campaign promoting a “no special rights 
for gays” ballot measure produced video and print material 
drawing attention to “the gay agenda,” sexual promiscuity, po-
lygamy, pedophilia, and the idea that homosexuality is a mat-
ter of choice rather than biology.192 Oregon’s Measure 9 also 
featured a ballot title that stated government “must discourage 
homosexuality,” and the official summary of the measure 
equated homosexuality with “pedophilia, sadism and maso-
chism” and specified that the state must “assist in setting a 
standard for Oregon’s youth that recognizes [these behaviors] 
as abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse.”193 Former Ore-
gon State Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde cited Measure 9 
as a particularly invidious application of direct democracy that 
violated the Federal Constitution’s Guarantee Clause—largely 
because the measure appeared to be motivated by animus and 
contained stigmatizing language directed against homosexu-
als.194
During Idaho’s 1994 initiative campaign against anti-
discrimination protections, Kelly Walton, founder of the Idaho 
Citizen’s Alliance (which promoted the initiative) stated that 
the primary goal of the measure was to “prevent homosexuals 
from attaining special legal privileges. Goal number two was to 
prevent the behavior [from] being taught as normal and 
 
 
 192. David Douglass, Taking the Initiative: Anti-Homosexual Propaganda 
of the Oregon Citizen’s Alliance, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 27.  
 193. Linde, supra note 2, at 36 n.71 (quoting STATE OF OREGON, VOTERS’ 
PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 1992, at 93 
(1992)). The measure failed with 43% of votes in favor. Initiative, Referendum 
and Recall: 1988-1995, supra note 66. The following year, voters in sixteen Or-
egon municipalities approved local “Sons of Measure 9” ordinances. Gamble, 
supra note 65, at 264. 
 194. See Linde, supra note 2, at 40–41 (arguing that since such ballot 
measures are motivated so thoroughly by passion and prejudice that they vio-
late the concept of republican government promised by the Guarantee Clause). 
See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative 
Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct 
Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583 (1994) (arguing that the intolerant motives 
behind anti-gay rights ballot measures justify greater pre-election challenges 
that would prevent such measures from reaching the ballot). 
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healthy to our kids in primary and secondary education.”195 
Walton stressed, further, that “many, many homosexuals are 
recruited at a very young age, low teens, very, very typical. Yes, 
it’s something that is mostly taught and caught.”196
Recent campaigns against same-sex marriage evaluated in 
this article were largely devoid of the overt, stigmatizing lan-
guage and explicit animus found in the 1990s.
 
197 Nonetheless, 
contemporary claims that same-sex marriage threatened chil-
dren, schools, and religious values did echo older stereotypes 
about lesbians and gays seeking to obtain “special rights” in or-
der to use the power of government to impose a “homosexual 
agenda” and “gay lifestyle” on an unwilling public.198 Psycholo-
gists report that traditional negative anti-gay stereotypes in-
clude portraits of gay men as “hypersexual, over visible, hereti-
cal and conspiratorial.”199 Content analysis of conservative 
evangelical Protestant videos and publications such as Christi-
anity Today showed homosexuality depicted as a behavior that 
is chosen or taught (rather than biologically determined), with 
gay men shown as “predators” who “target children” and are 
plagued with diseases.200 Contemporary campaign claims that 
the right for lesbians and gays to marry is equal to teaching 
about homosexuality in public schools, in particular, dove-tails 
with enduring stereotypes of gay men as sexual predators who 
need to “recruit” young people.201
 
 195. Harvey Pitman, In Their Own Words: Conversations with Campaign 
Leaders, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 
 The claims of threats to chil-
dren in campaign appeals may be effective, given that percep-
tions of threats to children can elicit emotional arousal that 
94, at 78. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing recent campaigns against same-sex 
marriage). 
 198. See Douglass, supra note 192, at 69 (finding that 12% of letters to the 
editor regarding homosexuality that were published by The Idaho Statesman 
in the mid-1990s contained the theme of the “gay agenda”). 
 199. See BARRY D. ADAM, THE SURVIVAL OF DOMINATION: INFERIORIZATION 
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 24–27 (1978) (describing historical stereotypes of homo-
sexuals); Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men, in JOHN C. GONSIOREK & JAMES D. WEINRICH, HOMOSEXUALI-
TY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 60, 69–70 (1991).  
 200. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 76–80 (1997). Herman also finds a theme where ascendant 
“gay power” is part of the threat. See id. at 82–91 (exploring fears of a homo-
sexual agenda). 
 201. See Pitman, supra note 195, at 78 (quoting anti-gay initiative founder 
Kelly Walton as saying that homosexuality is “something that is mostly taught 
and caught”). 
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constrains complex reasoning and leaves parents subject to 
simplistic reasoning and errors in decision making.202
In this way, contemporary campaigns against lesbian and 
gay rights can be seen as descendants from those of the 1970s. 
Anita Bryant’s successful 1977 campaign to repeal a Dade 
County, Florida anti-discrimination ordinance frequently ap-
pealed to stereotypes about the threat of gay men as deviant 
sexual predators.
 
203 Gregory M. Herek also notes that Bryant 
named her campaign organization “Save Our Children,” and 
quotes her as claiming that acceptance of gay teachers “could 
encourage more homosexuality by inducing pupils into looking 
upon it as an acceptable life-style” and that “a particularly de-
viant-minded teacher could sexually molest children.”204 Bryant 
also warned that “militant homosexuality” posed a severe 
threat to American families.205 Slippery-slope arguments about 
same-sex marriage being forced on school children found in 
contemporary campaigns206 echo Bryant circa 1977.207
IV.  SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNS AGAINST 
MINORITIES   
 
The previous section established that when same-sex mar-
riage and similar gay rights questions are on the ballot, voters 
are exposed to information that defines gays and lesbians, or 
the rights of gays and lesbians, as a dangerous threat. In this 
Part, I consider the effects of direct-democracy campaigns, not 
in terms of how the results of these ballot measures structure 
 
 202. See IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 45–80 (1977) (dis-
cussing the effects of psychological stress on decision making); Herek, supra 
note 199, at 71 (“Once parents have perceived a threat to their children, how-
ever, their level of emotional arousal typically is too high to permit easy assim-
ilation of such complex concepts. Instead, they are prone to overly simplistic 
thinking, errors of reasoning, and faulty decision-making processes.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 203. Herek, supra note 199, at 70. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See generally ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIV-
AL OF OUR NATION’S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 
(1977) (Bryant’s autobiography detailing her campaign against “militant ho-
mosexuality”).  
 206. See, e.g., Protectmarriage.com, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Truth, supra note 163. 
 207. See William E. Adams, Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The 
Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 449 (1998) (quoting Bryant as stating that “if gays 
are granted rights, next we’ll have to give rights to prostitutes and to people 
who sleep with St. Bernards”).  
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minority rights and public policy, but rather in terms of how 
the campaigns affect the behavior and attitudes of voters.  
A number of empirical studies report that direct democracy 
has secondary effects on citizens.208 These effects are at least 
partially independent of policies produced by the process, but 
they result from citizens being exposed to the process of direct 
democracy itself.209 Some scholars claim that direct-democracy 
campaigns make better citizens because the process has “edu-
cative effects,” by which voters are regularly asked to cast deci-
sions about policy through direct democracy, and thus make 
more politically efficacious decisions210 and are more knowl-
edgeable of political facts.211 Others note that some studies find-
ing beneficial educative effects of ballot initiatives cannot be 
replicated,212 and that by regularly challenging the legitimacy 
of representative government, direct democracy may under-
mine trust in government.213 At minimum, campaigns over is-
sues placed on the ballot lead to more voters reporting being 
aware of the issue.214
 
 208. See, e.g., DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INI-
TIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 138 (2004) (“[C]itizens living in 
states with frequent ballot initiatives are more motivated to vote, are most in-
terested in and better informed about politics, and express more confidence in 
government responsiveness than do citizens living in noninitiative states.”). 
 The presence of an initiative on a state 
ballot may also condition how voters make choices between 
candidates by priming them to evaluate rival candidates in 
 209. See id. at 139 (“The educative effects of ballot initiatives on broad lev-
els of political participation, civic engagement, and confidence in government 
may be as important for American democracy as the initiative’s direct effect on 
public policy.”). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See generally Mark A. Smith, Ballot Initiatives and the Democratic 
Citizen, 64 J. POL. 894 (2002) (finding that “voters from states that heavily use 
initiatives show an increased capacity over the long term to correctly answer 
factual questions about politics”). 
 212. See Joshua J. Dyck & Edward L. Lascher, Direct Democracy and Polit-
ical Efficacy Reconsidered, 31 POL. BEHAV. 401, 412 (2009) (challenging empir-
ical studies that concluded that direct democracy was related to internal and 
external efficacy); see also Daniel Schlozman & Ian Yohai, How Initiatives 
Don’t Always Make Citizens: Ballot Initiatives in the American States, 1978–
2004, 30 POL. BEHAV. 469, 483 (2008) (finding that “grandiose claims about 
initiatives redrawing the nature of citizenship are overdrawn and, in some in-
stances, wrong”). 
 213. See Joshua J. Dyck, Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in 
Government, 37 AM. POL. RES. 539, 547 (2009) (“Exposure to direct legislation 
does seem to initiate distrust in government.”). 
 214. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 152; Nicholson, supra note 
153, at 405–08.  
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terms of the initiative issue the voter is also evaluating.215 Vot-
ers in states where same-sex marriage was on the ballot in 
2004 were significantly more likely to claim that gay marriage 
was a very important issue when choosing between George W. 
Bush and John Kerry than were voters in states where mar-
riage was not on the ballot.216
Candidates, for their part, sponsor ballot initiative not only 
to shape policy, but to send cues to voters about the candidate’s 
policy positions and ideology.
 
217 Candidates and party officials 
have also been shown to view ballot initiatives as an indirect 
means to increase turnout for a preferred candidate,218 yet stud-
ies have not determined that placing an issue (such as gay 
marriage) on a state’s ballot increased turnout to the benefit of 
a particular candidate who shared the majority’s position on 
the issue.219 There is, however, substantial evidence that ballot 
measures increase voter turnout in aggregate at the state level, 
particularly in “midterm” elections that lack the mobilizing 
forces of presidential contests.220
The potential turnout, priming, and “educative” effects of 
direct-democracy campaigns are probably not exclusive to cam-
paigns associated with any particular type of ballot issue. 
Turnout effects have been found to be associated with the 
  
 
 215. See STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, 
ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 15 (2005) (“If an issue is on the agen-
da, even if only discussed in one type of race, its effects will be widespread, 
shaping voters’ candidate judgments up and down the ballot.”).  
 216. See Donovan et al., supra note 34, at 1298 (“The marriage issue had a 
stronger effect on support for Bush in states where marriage measures were 
on the ballot.”). 
 217. Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (And Vice Versa), 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2000). 
 218. Id. at 738; see also SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 208, at 118. See gen-
erally Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096 
(2005) (arguing that candidates use initiatives to affect turnout in elections 
and to highlight campaign issues that they believe will help them win). 
 219. See Daniel A. Smith et al., Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures and 
the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 78, 88 (finding that 
turnout in Ohio and Michigan increased in 2004 “irrespective of support for 
the anti-gay marriage amendments”).  
 220. See SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 208, at 37 (“Midterm elections are 
low-information elections with very few sources of mobilization, thus making 
the electorate more sensitive to those sources of mobilization that exist, such 
as ballot measures.”); Caroline J. Tolbert, Daniel C. Bowen & Todd Donovan, 
Initiative Campaigns: Direct Democracy and Voter Mobilization, 37 AM. POL. 
RES. 155, 181 (2009) (“[T]he research provides solid evidence of a turnout ef-
fect at the individual level in both presidential and midterm elections.”). 
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number of measures on a state’s ballot,221 with levels of cam-
paign spending on ballot measures,222 and with the salience of 
the issue (measured in terms of media attention),223 but not in 
terms of issue type. Initiatives on nuclear freeze,224 same-sex 
marriage,225 abortion, and the environment226 have been found 
to prime voter considerations about candidates. The empirical 
literature does not establish that direct-democracy campaigns 
against minorities have particularly distinctive turnout or 
priming effects.227 Nonetheless, the sum of this literature sug-
gests strongly that by having same-sex marriage measures on 
the ballot, turnout levels may rise, and more voters may be 
considering the marriage issue when voting on candidates.228
Yet given the unique context of direct-democracy cam-
paigns against minorities, it would seem that some of the other 
“educative effects” of direct-democracy process would operate 
differently here. As noted above, direct-democracy campaigns 
against minority rights are unique in that they highlight and 
advertise the threats associated with the targeted minority and 
the threat (to the majority) of extending rights to the targeted 
minority. Joshua J. Dyck demonstrates that, whatever positive 
citizenship effects of direct democracy exist broadly for the ma-
jority of citizens, the process creates conflict and decreases so-
cial trust where the majority perceives a greater threat of a 
 
 
 221. See Matt Childers & Mike Binder, Engaged by the Initiative? How the 
Use of Citizen Initiatives Increases Voter Turnout, 65 POL. RES. Q. 93, 93 
(2012) (“As the number of initiatives on a ballot rises during midterm elec-
tions, voter turnout does as well, but these effects do so with diminishing mar-
ginal returns as the number of initiatives increases.”). 
 222. Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan, supra note 220, at 178 fig.3. 
 223. See generally Mark A. Smith, The Contingent Effects of Ballot Initia-
tives and Candidate Races on Turnout, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700 (2001) (analyz-
ing the potential of campaigns for ballot measures and elected offices to draw 
to the polls citizens who otherwise would not vote). 
 224. NICHOLSON, supra note 215, at 61–90. 
 225. Donovan et al., supra note 34, at 1229. 
 226. NICHOLSON, supra note 215, at 52 tbl.4.4. 
 227. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 219, at 84 (“[C]ounties with higher 
levels of support for the measures banning same-sex marriage appear to have 
had greater support for Bush in 2004, though not higher turnout, compared 
with the 2000 election.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Donovan et al., supra note 34, at 1227–28 (“Our results 
demonstrate that state same-sex marriage campaigns encouraged some voters 
. . . to be more likely to see gay marriage as an important issue. That we find 
this relationship toward the end of the campaign, but not early in the cam-
paign, suggests strongly that the marriage measures were the mechanism that 
primed some voters to assess candidates in terms of the gay marriage issue.”). 
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minority.229 He demonstrates further evidence of the minority-
threat effect by finding that evangelical Christians who lived 
near larger gay populations were more likely to support state 
marriage bans in 2004 than other evangelical Christians.230
Beyond stimulating awareness of, and interest in an issue, 
messages associated with ballot measures targeting minority 
rights can trigger perceptions (among some people) that the 
group targeted by the ballot question presents some sort of 
threat.
 
231 These messages can also activate or perpetuate nega-
tive stereotypes and predispositions about the targeted group. 
As a result, popular votes on rights may increase popular ani-
mosity toward members of the group whose rights are in ques-
tion. Derrick Bell, Jr. has argued that the emotionally charged 
atmosphere surrounding direct-democracy campaigns against 
minorities “can easily reduce the care with which the voters 
consider the matters submitted to them,” and that such cam-
paigns reduce voter tolerance.232
Research that I have conducted with Caroline Tolbert test-
ed hypotheses about how exposure to direct-democracy cam-
paigns against same-sex marriage in 2004 made some people 
less accepting of homosexuals.
  
233 We found a number of reasons 
to expect that exposure to and receptivity to information about 
the threat of same-sex marriage would be more prevalent 
among people who attended religious services frequently in 
states where marriage was on the ballot.234
 
 229. Joshua J. Dyck, Racial Threat, Direct Legislation, and Social Trust: 
Taking Tyranny Seriously in Studies of the Ballot Initiative, 65 POL. RES. Q. 
615, 618 (2012) (finding an interaction between the proportion of an area that 
is non-white, and initiative use that erodes trust, resulting in lower trust 
when initiatives are used in a context of greater racial/ethnic diversity).  
 As for exposure to 
information, the context surrounding this issue was different in 
states where marriage was on the ballot. Information about 
gays and lesbians and about same-sex marriage was certainly 
 230. Joshua J. Dyck & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Conspiracy of Si-
lence: Context and Voting on Gay Marriage Ballot Measures, 65 POL. RES. Q. 
745, 752 (2012). 
 231. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how direct-democracy campaigns 
change perceptions of targeted minority groups). 
 232. Bell, supra note 3, at 18–20. 
 233. See generally Todd Donovan & Caroline Tolbert, Do Popular Votes on 
Rights Create Animosity Toward Minorities?, 66 POL. RES. Q. 1 (forthcoming 
Dec. 2013). 
 234. See id. at 10–11 (discussing the issues of exposure to and receptivity of 
same-sex marriage information). 
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prevalent in states where marriage was not being voted on.235 
However, people were likely to have experienced a different in-
formation environment where marriage was a ballot ques-
tion.236 In these states church directories were used to target 
phone calls about the gay marriage issue to religious voters.237 
In initiative states, groups organized to promote or oppose mar-
riage bans that reached the ballot.238 Newspapers also directed 
more news and editorial content to the marriage question closer 
to election-day in states where it was on the 2004 ballot.239 Mail 
with anti-gay-marriage themes was targeted toward religious 
conservatives and church sermons were used to promote sup-
port for the ballot measures.240 Thus, despite low levels of cam-
paign spending on same-sex marriage in 2004, many voters, 
particularly those who both resided and attended religious ser-
vices in states where marriage was on the ballot and, were ex-
posed to information about same-sex marriage (and by exten-
sion, lesbians and gays) as a threat.241
As for receptivity to negative information about gays and 
lesbians, disapproval of homosexuality has been found to be 
greater among people who attended religious services regularly 




 235. See, e.g., Jim McLaughlin, Racine Crowd Backs Chick-fil-A’s Gay-
Marriage Stance, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 2012), http://www.jsonline 
.com/news/wisconsin/hundreds-turn-out-in-racine-to-support-chickfila-cc6b5np 
-164617146.html (showing how the issue of gay-marriage drew significant at-
tention in Wisconsin, a state without gay marriage on the ballot). 
 
Given this, we tested if frequent attendance at religious ser-
 236. See Donovan & Tolbert, supra note 233, at 10 (discussing the exposure 
people received, such as church bulletins or telephone calls); see also Donovan 
et al., supra note 34, at 1220 (discussing the frequency that gay marriage was 
mentioned in newspapers in states where gay marriage was on the ballot); 
Smith, supra note 223, at 701 (discussing the level of awareness of issues 
about propositions, and relating it to news coverage and informal discussions 
among citizens, as well as campaigns).  
 237. Campbell & Monson, supra note 119, at 407. 
 238. See supra Part III (discussing groups that campaigned for and against 
same-sex marriage). 
 239. Donovan et al., supra note 34, at 1220.  
 240. Campbell & Monson, supra note 119. 
 241. See Donovan & Tolbert, supra note 233, at 17 (“Having a popular vote 
on the right to marriage corresponded with a significantly increased likelihood 
that a particular sub-set of respondents rated gays and lesbians at the lowest 
end of the thermometer scale—those who we assume may have been more 
likely to be exposed to and receptive to themes that portrayed marriage among 
same-sex couples as a threat to heterosexuals.”). 
 242. Gregory B. Lewis, Black-White Differences in Attitudes Toward Homo-
sexuality and Gay Rights, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 59, 66 (2003).  
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vices by those who were religiously inclined corresponded with 
a person coming to perceive that gays and lesbians constituted 
a threat.243 We tested our hypotheses using public-opinion data 
collected in period American National Election Study (ANES) 
surveys.244 ANES surveys asked respondents to rate various 
groups (including gays and lesbians) on a 0 to 100 feeling-
thermometer scale, with ratings above 50 “meaning you feel fa-
vorable and warm” toward the group and ratings below 50 
“meaning you feel unfavorable and cool” toward the group.245 
Although not a direct measure of threat perception, we suggest 
the thermometer measure serves as a useful surrogate of threat 
perceptions.246 At minimum, we assumed that people who rated 
gays and lesbians lower on the scale after the campaign against 
same-sex marriage had grown less sympathetic toward gays 
and lesbians.247 A rare panel study provided us with a person’s 
rating of gays and lesbians in 2002, and with the same person’s 
rating of gays and lesbians immediately after the 2004 elec-
tion.248 This provided an opportunity to test if an individual’s 
assessment of gays and lesbians was lower in states where 
same—sex marriage was on the ballot, while controlling for the 
respondent’s assessment offered earlier. We tested if rating 
gays and lesbians very low on the scale (at 10 or lower) corre-
sponded with living in a state where marriage was on the bal-
lot.249
Our results suggested that there was a significant rela-
tionship between religiosity and increased animosity toward 
lesbians and gays in 2004, but that this effect was limited to re-
ligious individuals living in states where a same-sex marriage 
ban was on the ballot.
 
250
  Put differently, popular votes on marriage did not correspond with 
people in those states, on average, growing cooler toward gays and 
lesbians. Having a popular vote on the right to marriage corresponded 
 As Tolbert and I explained:  
 
 243. Donovan & Tolbert, supra note 233, at 13–14. 
 244. Id. at 11. 
 245. In 2004, the mean rating for gays and lesbians was 44.9, down from 
45.2 in 2002. In 2002 14.5% of respondents rated gays and lesbians at 10 or 
lower. In 2004, 17.2% of respondents rated gays and lesbians at 10 or lower. 
This compares to mean ratings in 2004 of 65.4 for Hispanics (1.0% at 10 or 
lower), 66.2% for Asians (1.4% at 10 or lower), 66.5 for Jews (0.7% at 10 or 
lower) and 68.7% for Blacks (0.7% at 10 or lower). Id. at 23.  
 246. Id. at 12–13. 
 247. Id. at 15, 25. 
 248. Id. at 11–12. 
 249. Id. at 9–10. 
 250. Id. at 17, 25. 
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with a significantly increased likelihood that a particular sub-set of 
respondents rated gays and lesbians at the lowest end of the ther-
mometer scale—[religiously inclined people] who we assume may 
have been more likely to be exposed to and receptive to themes that 
portrayed marriage among same-sex couples as a threat to heterosex-
uals.251
This increased animosity reflects a potential spillover ef-
fect of direct-democracy campaigns against minorities that is 
quite contrary to the positive effects usually portrayed by the 
“educative effects” literature on direct democracy.
  
252 Despite the 
fact that contemporary campaigns against same-sex marriage 
avoid overt, stigmatizing language about gays and lesbians, 
these campaigns (at least in 2004) appear to have not only mo-
bilized opinion against same-sex marriage, but also against 
gays and lesbians themselves.253
It is important to put this result in context. What, for ex-
ample, is the substantive meaning of finding that some people 
in states where marriage was voted on became more likely to 
rate gays and lesbians at the lowest end of a feeling-
thermometer scale after a direct democracy campaign? What-
ever the meaning of the change in attitudes, this decreased ac-
ceptance of (or growth in animosity toward) gays and lesbians 
was concentrated among people who may have already been 
predisposed to be less acceptant of gays and lesbians.
  
254 Any ef-
fects the 2004 campaigns had on moving opinions against gays 
and lesbians, moreover, may have been short lived. Large ma-
jorities opposed same-sex marriage in 2004,255 but national 
opinion polls conducted after 2010 documented majority ac-
ceptance of same-sex unions.256 Where in 2004 campaigns could 
have sold the idea that gays and lesbians and same-sex unions 
were a threat, this appeal may have been less effective after 
2010.257
 
 251. Id. at 17. 
 This begs the question, however, of what the short-
term effects of these campaigns may have been. For example, 
campaigns against gay and lesbian rights may, by heightening 
 252. Id. at 20. 
 253. Id. at 19. 
 254. Id. at 17. 
 255. See generally Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Im-
pact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 151 (2009). 
 256. For a summary of poll trends, see Nate Silver, Gay Marriage Oppo-
nents Now in Minority, N.Y. TIMES FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 
11:18 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/gay-marriage 
-opponents-now-in-minority/. 
 257. Donovan & Tolbert, supra note 233, at 21. 
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animosity toward gays and lesbians among a small sub set of 
the population, increase hate crimes against gay men and les-
bians. Campaigns against same-sex marriage may have addi-
tional spillover effects by highlighting unpopular court deci-
sions. If voters respond to campaign attacks on courts, popular 
regard for the judiciary may suffer as a result.258
V.  THE END OF MINORITY THREAT?   
 
Direct-democracy campaigns against minority rights are 
unique in that they often emerge as a political backlash to mi-
nority rights that are portrayed as a threat to the majority.259 
Unlike candidate races, and unlike other direct-democracy con-
tests, voter decisions on such matters can be based on affect (or 
hostility) toward the group targeted by the ballot proposal. 
Backlash may not be limited to the minority group that poses a 
threat to the majority.260 Backlash may also include a reaction 
against the democratic institutions that protect minorities and 
that are designed to mute the force of majority passion and 
opinion. Direct-democracy campaigns against the threat of mi-
nority rights may also have unique spillover effects. In the case 
of same-sex marriage rights, state-level anti-marriage cam-
paigns that highlighted the threat of extending marriage rights 
to lesbians and gays corresponded with a subset of voters in 
those states growing less sympathetic to lesbians and gays.261
But do the campaigns against same-sex marriage inform 
us about future campaigns against minority rights? It may very 
well be that the cumulative effect of decades of court decisions 
overturning initiatives and referendums that restricted minori-
ty rights—decisions blocking ballot measures that targeted pri-
vate religious schools, nullifying measures that allowed race-
based housing discrimination, decisions that banned voter-
approved school segregation, and decisions that overturned 
 
 
 258. There is evidence of a link between attitudes about same-sex marriage 
and attitudes about the courts. Opponents of same-sex marriage in Washing-
ton state were found to be significantly more likely to support popular election 
of state supreme court judges than supporters of same-sex marriage (respond-
ents were asked if they favored having a court appointed by a merit system or 
a court elected directly by voters). Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Public Atti-
tudes About Reforming Judicial Elections 24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (presented at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association 
Meeting, Spokane, Washington, Oct. 2007).  
 259. See supra Part II. 
 260. See supra Part II. 
 261. See supra Part IV.A. 
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measures prohibiting government from protecting gays and 
lesbians from job discrimination—have shut the door on any fu-
ture direct-democracy campaigns against minorities and their 
rights. 
One could argue that we may see the end of direct-
democracy campaigns against gay and lesbian rights. Popular 
attitudes about gays and lesbians have been changing, becom-
ing more tolerant since the 1970s. Acceptance of homosexuali-
ty,262 support for civil unions,263 and popular support for full ac-
cess to marriage264 all increased dramatically since the 1990s. 
Moreover, immediately after North Carolina voters amended 
their state’s constitution to ban gay marriage in May of 2012, 
President Barack Obama used the institution’s “bully pulpit” to 
speak out in support of equal rights in marriage.265 President 
Obama’s act could have had the effect of moving opinion even 
further toward acceptance of LBGT rights,266 or opinion may 
have already moved. In 2012, voters in three states extended 
the right to marry to same-sex couples and voters in a fourth 
state rejected a ban on same-sex marriage.267 The Supreme 
Court announced that it would determine the constitutionality 
of California’s Prop. 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
in 2013.268
 
 262. See generally Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization in Attitudes To-
ward Homosexuality, 1973 to 1988, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762 (2001) (examining 
reasons for changing attitudes toward homosexuality).  
 The court could end direct legislation on same-sex 
marriage via the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process 
 263. E.g., Majority Continues to Support Civil Unions, PEW RES. CENTER 
(Oct. 9. 2009), http://www.people-press.org/2009/10/09/majority-continues-to 
-support-civil-unions/.  
 264. Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support Legal Gay Marriage, 
GALLUP POLITICS (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half 
-americans-support-legal-gay-marriage.aspx (reporting that Gallup polls found 
27% support for marriage between same-sex couples in 1996 had increased to 
50% in 2012). 
 265. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, 
Taking Stand on Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1. 
 266. Benjamin I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion?, 81 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 23, 39 (1987) (demonstrating that presidents influence public opinion on 
policies). 
 267. Lauren Markoe, 2012 Shows a Social Sea Change on Gay Marriage, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07/ 
national/35506637_1_maryland-and-washington-state-gay-marriage 
-marriages-between-two-men. 
 268. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Two Challenges on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/ 
us/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-two-cases-on-gay-marriage.html. 
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Clause, or the Full Faith and Credit Clause269 just as other 
courts ended earlier cycles of direct-democracy campaigns 
against minorities.270
Even if, hypothetically, majority opinion or the courts did 
become fully acceptant of gay rights, direct-democracy cam-
paigns against other minorities would not necessarily cease. 
For this to be the case, we would need to assume that lesbians 
and gays were, in effect, the “last minority.” Such an assump-
tion would be challenging, given the history of democracy in 
America. Since the adoption of direct democracy, there have 
regularly been minorities whose rights have been decided on 
state ballots by a majority of voters. The list includes (but is by 
no means limited to) voting rights for blacks repealed by a 
white majority,
 We might conclude from all of this that 
direct-democracy campaigns targeting the rights of lesbians 
and gays could become a thing of the past. After all, majority 
opinion cannot be mobilized against a minority if doing so is 
unconstitutional, or if the majority is no longer apprehensive 
about the minority.  
271 Catholics targeted by the Ku Klux Klan,272 
Catholics and other immigrants targeted by prohibitionists,273 
Japanese immigrants targeted by white prejudice,274 Com-
munists targeted by the California Republican Party,275
 
 269. See Thomas M. Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of 
Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 
501–08 (1994) (arguing for recognition of same-sex marriage derived from the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
 African 
 270. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (applying the 
Due Process Clause to overrule a citizens’ initiative aimed at eliminating 
Catholic schools). 
 271. CRONIN, supra note 68, at 92–93.  
 272. Oregon Ballot Measure 6, the Compulsory Public Education Bill 
(1922), BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Oregon_Ballot 
_Measure_6,_the_Compulsory_Public_Education_Bill_%281922%29 (last mod-
ified June 13, 2012); see also Catholics and Education: Oregon School Initia-
tive, June 26, 1922, AM. CATH. HIS. RES. CENTER & UNIV. ARCHIVES, http:// 
cuomeka.wrlc.org/exhibits/show/osc/documents/osc-doc2 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2013) (describing the Ku Klux Klan’s role in the ballot initiative). 
 273. JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE 
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 56–57 (1963); Joseph R. Gusfield, Social 
Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union, 61 AM. J. SOC. 221, 225 (1955). 
 274. Brian J. Gaines & Wendy K. Tam Cho, On California’s 1920 Alien 
Land Law: The Psychology and Economics of Racial Discrimination, 4 ST. POL. 
& POL’Y Q. 271, 273–76 (2004). 
 275. JONATHAN BELL, CALIFORNIA CRUCIBLE: THE FORGING OF MODERN 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 171 (2012). 
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Americans targeted by opponents of desegregation,276 Latino 
immigrants targeted by the California Republican Party,277 and 
AIDS victims targeted by Lynden LaRouche.278
Making this generalization—taking the proposition that 
gays and lesbians could become a minority whose rights are no 
longer to be decided by direct democracy to mean that all mi-
nority-rights questions will no longer be decided by direct de-
mocracy—would also require that we assume political entre-
preneurs will no longer find reason to mobilize majority opinion 
against another threatening minority in the future. Historic 
precedent and contemporary political practice suggests that 
these assumptions are wrong.  
  
As an example, Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican presi-
dential nominee, voiced stereotypes about his opponent that 
played to popular fears and prejudices about Muslims, a minor-
ity that most Americans perceived as being a threat to Ameri-
can culture.279 Romney’s language was directed at the presi-
dent, an African American with the middle name Hussein and 
the family name Obama.280 Defining himself as something dis-
tinctly opposite of (and by implication better than) President 
Barack Obama, Romney noted publicly that he required no 
birth certificate to demonstrate that he was American.281
 
 276. Bell, supra note 
 Fur-
ther, Romney falsely claimed, repeatedly, that the African-
American president he previously mocked for not being Ameri-
3, at 15–22. 
 277. See Daniel A. Smith & Caroline Tolbert, The Initiative to Party: Parti-
sanship and Ballot Initiatives in California, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 739, 744–45 
(2001) (describing the partisan divide in support for an “official English” initi-
ative). 
 278. Sponsored by a Lyndon LaRouche organization, California Proposition 
64 of 1986 would have prevented HIV-positive individuals from attending or 
teaching in public schools. See Charles Petit, California to Vote on AIDS Prop-
osition, SCIENCE, Oct. 17, 1986, at 277.  
 279. Erik Nisbet et al., THE “BIN LADEN” EFFECT: HOW AMERICAN PUBLIC 
OPINION ABOUT MUSLIM AMERICANS SHIFTED IN THE WAKE OF OSAMA BIN 
LADEN’S DEATH 3 (2011), available at http://www.eriknisbet.com/files/ 
binladen_report.pdf. A random sample survey of Americans found most people 
disagreed that Muslims were trustworthy, most disagreed Muslims were 
peaceful, most supported a ban on construction of new Mosques, most agreed 
Muslims “undermine American culture” and most agree that American Mus-
lims should “register their whereabouts with the U.S. government.” Id. at 3–4.  
 280. Barack Obama, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, http://www.biography.com/ 
people/barack-obama-12782369 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
 281. See Philip Rucker & Felicia Sonmez, Romney Jokes about his Birth 
Certificate; Obama Campaign Accuses him of Embracing ‘Birtherism’, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 24, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-24/politics/ 
35491694_1_romney-adviser-kevin-madden-romney-jokes-governor-romney. 
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can, (and assumed to be Muslim by many Republicans282) “sym-
pathize[d] with those [radical Islamists] who waged the at-
tacks” on the American embassies in Benghazi and Cairo.283 
Romney’s claim that Obama sympathized with Islamist attack-
ers was quickly echoed on Twitter by the Republican National 
Party chair.284
Not long before Romney was promoting the idea that Pres-
ident Obama sympathized with violent, extremist Muslims,
  
285 
county officials in suburban Chicago were being forced to re-
consider a zoning decision that would have permitted construc-
tion of a mosque.286 Facing similar opposition—including public 
protests, a local Republican congressional candidate linking 
construction of the mosque to Hamas and Jihad, and lawsuits 
by opponents—Muslims in Rutherford County, Tennessee, were 
unable to open a place of worship until a federal judge ordered 
that it could operate.287 An attempt to site a mosque in Brent-
wood, Tennessee, was also defeated by popular opposition.288 A 
proposal for a community center and mosque on Park Place in 
Manhattan faced public opposition fomented by a group named 
Stop Islamization of America.289
 
 282. Thirty-one percent of Republicans surveyed by Pew Research respond-
ed “Muslim” when asked in 2010 what President Obama’s religion was. PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., GROWING NUMBER OF AMERICANS SAY OBAMA IS A MUSLIM 5 
(2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/645.pdf. 
 After President Obama ex-
pressed support for “the right to build a place of worship and a 
community center on private property in lower Manhattan,” 
 283. Kasie Hunt, Fact-Checking Romney’s Statements on Libya Attack, 
MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/presidentelect/ 
ci_21543165/fact-checking-romneys-statements-libya-attacks. 
 284. Reince Priebus, TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:01 PM), https://twitter 
.com/Reince/status/245733811747422208 (“Obama sympathizes with attackers 
in Egypt. Sad and pathetic.”). 
 285. See Hunt, supra note 283. 
 286. James Fuller, Mosque Vote Will Test Attendance for Kane County Offi-
cials, DAILY HERALD (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/ 
20120808/news/708089679. 
 287. Kim Severson, Judge Allows Muslims to Use Tennessee Mosque, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/us/judge-allows 
-muslims-to-use-murfreesboro-mosque.html. 
 288. Bob Smietana, Brentwood Mosque Not Alone in Defeat: Plans for Plac-
es of Worship Face Growing Resistance, TENNESSEAN (May 23, 2010), http:// 
www.tennessean.com/article/20100523/NEWS06/10923001. Opposition was 
led by a United Methodist Church member who claimed that “not enough peo-
ple understand the political doctrine of Islam.” Id.  
 289. Justin Elliott, How the “Ground Zero Mosque” Fear Mongering Began, 
SALON (Aug. 16, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/08/16/ground_ 
zero_mosque_origins/. 
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another Republican presidential candidate—Newt Gingrich—
accused the President of “pandering to radical Islam.”290 Survey 
data suggest Gingrich’s position was closer to the opinions of 
most Americans than the President’s position.291
Land-use decisions affecting the rights of Muslims to con-
struct places of worship have not (yet) reached ballots in Amer-
ican states and communities, but the discussion above illus-
trates that gays and lesbians are certainly not the last 
unpopular minority in America whose rights may be deter-
mined by the force of popular opinion. Immigrants, smokers, 
accused criminals, and convicted felons might be added to the 
list of unpopular minorities whose rights have been and may 
continue to be decided by voters.
 
292 The political conditions sur-
rounding Muslims in America are similar to conditions associ-
ated with other groups that have been made the subjects of 
popular votes in past decades. As with gays and lesbians in 
previous decades, a majority of Americans view Muslims as a 
threat,293 and prominent, mainstream politicians have sought 
political advantage by exploiting negative stereotypes associat-
ed with the group.294 Switzerland—the only other nation that 
makes regular use of direct democracy—has already experi-
enced a referendum on the construction of minarets, an archi-
tectural feature of Islamic mosques.295
 
 290. Romesh Ratnesar, Ground Zero: Exaggerating the Jihadist Threat, 
TIME (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011400, 
00.html. 
 Although only four min-
arets were ever constructed in that country, proponents of the 
August 2009 national referendum claimed minarets had no re-
ligious value, but, rather, symbolized Islamic intolerance and 
 291. CNN & OPINION RESEARCH CORP., AUG. 6–10 POLL (2010), available 
at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/08/11/rel11a1a.pdf. Sixty-eight 
percent reported being opposed to the “plan to build a mosque two blocks from 
the site in New York City where the World Trade Center used to stand.” Id. at 
3. Eighty-two percent of Republicans were opposed. Id. at 8.  
 292. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 293, 297 (arguing that direct democracy is used to limit minority 
rights). 
 293. See supra note 279. 
 294. See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Romney’s Israel-Palestine Comments Are 
Latest Chapter in Candidate’s Struggle with Muslims, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 20, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/18/romney 
-israel-palestine_n_1891868.html (describing Romney’s increasingly anti-
Muslim rhetoric during the course of his political career). 
 295. Swiss Voters Back Ban on Minarets, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2009) http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8385069.stm. 
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the “Islamisation” of Swiss society.296 Swiss voters approved the 
initiative constitutional amendment with fifty-seven percent 
support.297
  CONCLUSION   
  
Minority rights and popular opinion are often in conflict in 
democratic political systems. Majority opinion may at times 
trump the interests of minorities under any democratic institu-
tion. Legislatures, executives, and even courts can channel 
popular sentiments into policies that restrict minority rights.298
Campaigns against the rights of gays and lesbians are but one 
of many examples of direct democracy expanding conflicts over 
minority rights. Recurring conflicts associated with minority 
rights being decided by a popular vote may be seen by some as 
a sign of robust democratic politics. Others may find direct de-
mocracy’s expansion of conflicts over rights a recipe for dema-
goguery, and a process that is inconsistent with models of de-
mocracy that aim to protect minority interests. States need not 
abandon the popular initiative process to remedy this. A num-
ber of state constitutions place substantive subject restrictions 
on popular initiatives. Massachusetts does not allow initiatives 
on the subject of religion or the courts.
 
In this Article, I have argued that there is a unique relation-
ship between majority opinion and minority rights in direct 
democracy. It is unlike other democratic institutions not simply 
because choices about rights are made directly by a majority of 
voters, but because the context of choice is so heavily condi-
tioned by affect toward members of the group and perceptions 
that the minority presents a threat to the majority. Direct de-
mocracy expands the conflict over questions of rights. When 
minority rights are put to a popular vote, campaigns portray 
the minority as a threat and thus create spillover effects, with 
the members of the minority stigmatized in ways that would 
not have occurred were it not for the campaign against their 
rights. 
299 Alaska prohibits 
measures affecting the judiciary.300
 
 296. Haig Simonian, Mosque Vote Threatens to Isolate Swiss, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e8e36bfa-d85f-11de-b63a 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz26xR3NGAI. 
 Mississippi does not allow 
 297. Id. 
 298. See supra Part II. 
 299. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2. 
 300. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
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initiatives to change the state’s Bill of Rights.301 Other states 
prohibit measures on various fiscal questions.302
 
 301. MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273, cl. 5. This could also preclude popular 
votes that would expand rights. 
 Unless limits 
are placed on how initiatives and referendums are used to de-
fine minority rights, political campaigns targeting minority 
rights—with their associated spillover effects—will remain part 
of the American political system. 
 302. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 23; MO. CONST. art. II, § 51; NEV. 
CONST. art. XIX § 6. 
